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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this appeal from the 
judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, 
dated June 2, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err by finding that James Brockbank and Cheryl 
Rachele committed fraud under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, when James 
assigned his right to redeem property which was sold by Penny Brockbank at an 
execution sale, and when the assignee of the right of redemption, Cheryl Rachele 
exercised that right by paying to Penny the redemption price, which Penny herself 
established as the sole bidder at the execution sale? 
Standard of Review. This issue concerns legal conclusions that were 
decided by the trial court upon cross motions for summary judgment. Therefore, it 
is reviewed for correctness, Board of Educ. of Alpine School Dist v. Ward, 974 
P.2d 824, 825 (Utah 1999), with no deference given to the trial court's ruling, 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 
1030 (Utah 1995). 
This issue was preserved in Cheryl's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Record at 1338.) 
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2. Did the trial court err when it rescinded an allegedly fraudulent 
conveyance and then allowed the party claiming fraud to retain the benefit of the 
allegedly fraudulent conveyance? 
Standard of Review. This issue concerns legal conclusions that were 
decided by the trial court upon cross motions for summary judgment. Therefore, it 
is reviewed for correctness, Board of Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Ward, 974 
P.2d 824, 825 (Utah 1999), with no deference given to the trial court's ruling, 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 
1030 (Utah 1995). 
This issue was preserved in Cheryl's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Record at 1338.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS 
The determinative statutes are reproduced in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal arising from a final order entitled "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Cross Motions for Summary Judgment by Third 
Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant." This final order granted Penny 
Brockbank 's motion for summary judgment and found that the assignment of the 
right of redemption was a fraudulent transfer, even though Penny, the "defrauded" 
party, initiated the foreclosure proceeding and then accepted the full redemption 
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price and continues to retain that benefit. This order was signed June 2, 2000 by 
the Seventh Judicial District Court, Judge Bruce K. Halliday, presiding. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below 
In a Supplemental Decree dated February 18, 1998, Penny Brockbank was 
awarded a judgment in the amount of $42,832.88 against James Brockbank. The 
Supplemental Decree also awarded certain real property referred to as "the 48 East 
Property" to James and awarded Penny a lien on James's real property to secure 
Penny's judgment. The 48 East property had an approximate value of $45,000. 
Subsequently, Penny caused a writ of execution to be issued which resulted in a 
sheriffs sale conducted by the sheriff of Carbon County on December 23, 1998 of 
the 48 East Property. Penny credit bid $15,000 of her judgment against James for 
that property. 
Shortly thereafter, on January 5, 1999, James assigned his right of 
redemption, pursuant to Rule 69, to his friend, Cheryl Rachele for $50. Cheryl 
then redeemed the property by delivering a check for the amount of $16,653—the 
principal amount of the bid, the statutory interest surcharge, and attorney's fees— 
to the order of both Penny and the sheriff that conducted the sale, ensuring that she 
complied with Rule 69(j)(2). Penny accepted this money without objection, fully 
aware of the transfer between James and Cheryl. Penny's judgment against James 
was credited the amount of $15,000 in an order dated May 9, 1999. 
On January 6, 1999, Penny added Cheryl as a third party defendant to the 
divorce proceeding between Penny and James, claiming fraud in James's transfer 
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of the right of redemption to Cheryl.1 On or about December 23, 1999, Penny 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant. On or 
about January 21, 2000, Cheryl filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. On 
June 2, 2000, the court granted Penny's summary judgment motion, denied 
Cheryl's summary judgment motion, transferred the property to James, and 
entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from which this appeal is 
taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This appeal arises out of a complex fact situation arising from a 
divorce action between Respondent James Brockbank and Petitioner/Third Party 
Plaintiff Penny Brockbank. (Record at 1, 480.) 
2. On or about February 18, 1998, a Supplemental Decree was entered 
in that action, and, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the decree, James was awarded 
certain property, including the real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Utah (hereinafter "the 48 East Property"). (Record at 289, 292.) 
3. The Supplemental Decree also awarded Penny a judgment in the 
approximate amount of $42,832.88 against James. (Record at 294.) This 
judgment was affirmed in Brockbank Appeal # 1. 
1
 Penny also issued an order to show cause to find James in contempt for assigning 
the right of redemption, contending that the assignment violated the court's order 
restraining James form taking any action to convey or pledge the real property 
awarded to him. This court declined to address whether the assignment of the 
right of redemption was a conveyance or pledge of real property when the issue 
was before it on James's 2nd appeal. 
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4. Under the Decree, Penny was awarded a lien against all of James' 
real property. (Record at 294.) 
5. Penny caused a Writ of Execution to be levied on James' 48 East 
Property, which was valued at $45,000. (Record at 944.) 
6. At the sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property—which occurred on 
December 23, 1998—Penny, the sole bidder, credit bid the amount of Fifteen 
Thousand ($15,000). (Record at 491.) 
7. At that time, the mortgage remaining on the 48 East Property was 
approximately $2,000 to $3,000. (Record at 944, ^ 4.) 
8. Following the sheriffs sale, Penny took possession of the 48 East 
Property. (Record at 945, ^ 8.) 
9. James did not have the funds available to exercise his right of 
redemption, so he assigned the right of redemption to Third Party Defendant 
Cheiyl Rachele. (Record at 945-946, ffif 9,10.) 
10. Cheryl paid James $50 for the Assignment of the Right of 
Redemption. (Record at 485.) 
11. On January 5, 1999, Cheryl, using her credit cards and other 
available sources, redeemed the 48 East Property from Penny for $16,653, which 
included the bid price of $15,000, plus interest and attorney fees. (Record at 486-
487.) 
12. Penny accepted the amount of $16,653 as the redemption price of 
that property. (Record at 860-861.) 
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13. Thereafter, Cheryl took possession and control of the 48 East 
Property. (Record at 1116, page 123, Ins. 17-18.) 
14. On January 6, 1999, Penny added Cheryl as a third party defendant 
in Penny's divorce action. Penny claimed that James' assignment of the right of 
redemption to Cheryl was a fraudulent transfer, and ought to be voided. (Record 
at 480.) 
15. Notwithstanding Penny's third party complaint, Penny credited her 
judgment against James for the redemption amount of $ 15,000. (Record at 860-
861.) 
16. At no time has Penny returned or attempted to return or tender the 
amount of the redemption price to Cheryl. (Record at 1343, ^ 19.) 
17. The trial court, pursuant to Penny's Motion for an Order to Show 
Cause, held James in contempt for deeding the Property to Cheryl, on the basis 
that the deed violated the court's previous order restraining James from conveying 
or pledging his real property. (Record at 911.) 
18. James appealed the finding of contempt on the grounds that the right 
of redemption is not a real property interest and that he could not convey or pledge 
the real property after Penny purchased it at the sheriffs sale. Despite thorough 
briefing on the issues, the court's opinion did not address whether James's 
assignment of the right of redemption was a conveyance or pledge of real 
property. Brockbank appeal # 2; Appellate No. 980113. 
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19. While James' appeal was pending, Penny filed a motion for 
summary judgment against Cheryl. Penny sought to set aside the assignment of 
the right of redemption and subsequent redemption of the property as fraudulent 
transfers. (Record at 1193.) 
20. Cheryl filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds 
that Penny had waived any objection to the assignment and ratified the redemption 
by accepting and retaining the redemption price paid by Cheryl. (Record at 1338.) 
21. The trial court issued a ruling on June 2, 2000, in which it denied 
Cheryl's motion and granted Penny's. The final order was also entered on June 2, 
2000. (Record at 1507.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Relying upon the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the trial court found, 
upon cross motions for summary judgment, that James Brockbank's assignment of 
his right to redeem the 48 East Property was fraudulent. A close look at the 
language of the Act and at the nature of a right of redemption reveals, however, 
that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Penny's Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment and denying Cheryl's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Act allows a creditor to sue a debtor who seeks to shield assets from 
judgment by transferring the assets to another party. Penny, relying upon the Act, 
contends that James sought to hinder her claim by assigning his right to redeem 
the 48 East Property. However, a right of redemption is not an interest in real 
property; it is a longstanding right that affords debtors protection from over 
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zealous and oppressive creditors. Thus, when a sheriff sells a debtor's assets to 
satisfy a creditor's lien, the debtor may redeem the assets. To redeem assets, the 
debtor must pay the creditor the amount for which the assets were sold. Also, a 
right of redemption is transferable. Since a creditor received the money she was 
owed, exercising a right of redemption is not fraudulent as a matter of law—even 
if the original debtor or some assignee is the individual who exercises the right of 
redemption. 
In the present case, Penny cannot claim that transferring the right of 
redemption hindered, delayed, or defrauded her ability to collect the debt owed to 
her because she was paid the money upon execution of the judgment lien and sale 
of the 48 East Property. Additionally, James did not act with the actual intent to 
defraud Penny by assigning his right of redemption to Cheiyl. In fact, James paid 
the remainder of the judgment that he owed Penny subsequent to the redemption 
of the 48 East Property by selling other property that he owned. Because the 
assignment of a right of redemption cannot, as a matter of law, hinder, delay, or 
defraud a creditor, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not apply to James's 
assignment of the right of redemption. Therefore, the trial court erred by granting 
Penny's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Additionally, because Penny accepted and continues to retain the money 
that Cheiyl paid to her as the redemption price of the 48 East Property, Penny 
waived any objection she may have had to the assignment of the right of 
redemption. The law clearly does not allow an allegedly defrauded party to keep 
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the benefits of the purportedly fraudulent contract and to simultaneously have the 
contract declared void. Astoundingly, this is exactly what the trial court did— 
declaring the assignment of the right of redemption void and allowing Penny to 
keep the money that Cheryl paid to her in exercising the right of redemption. 
Clearly, the trial court erred as a matter of law by not granting Cheryl's Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment, dismissing Penny's third party complaint, and quieting title 
to the property in Cheryl. 
ARGUMENT 
Summaiy judgment should only be granted when "there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). The trial court's legal 
conclusions made in granting or denying a motion for summary judgment, 
including the conclusion that there are no genuine issues of material fact, are 
reviewed for correctness, Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. 
Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992), with no deference given to the 
trial court's conclusions, Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 
1112 (Utah 1991). Obviously, when the party that was granted summary 
judgment by the trial court was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
trial court's decision must be reversed. Conversely, when the party whose cross 
motion for summaiy judgment was denied was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, their motion must be granted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). 
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I. IT WAS ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT TO GRANT PENNY BROCKBANK'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE UNIFORM 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT CANNOT APPLY TO THE 
ASSIGNMENT OF A RIGHT OF REDEMPTION. 
Penny Brockbank's proposed construction of the law would essentially 
declare every transfer of a right of redemption fraudulent. Such a construction 
flies in the face of hundreds of years of protection that the common law has given 
debtors through the right to redeem property that has been sold to satisfy the claim 
of a creditor. Relying upon the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-6-1 et seq., the trial court held that James Brockbank's assignment of his 
right to redeem the 48 East Property to Cheryl Rachele was fraudulent. The court 
ruled that James acted with the intent to place the property out of Penny's reach, 
even though Penny initiated the sale and actually received the money that was due 
to her upon execution of the lien on the property and even though James did not 
assign the right of redemption with the intent to defraud Penny. Incredibly, the 
trial court then went on to declare the assignment void, while simultaneously 
allowing Penny to keep the money that Cheryl had paid to her upon exercising the 
redemption. 
*" The court did not understand the fact that Penny initiated the foreclosure 
proceedings and the fact that she decided the amount to bid are both conditions 
precedent to the right of redemption. 
The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that James's assignment of the 
right of redemption, as a matter of law, could not have placed the property beyond 
Penny's reach. This is because Penny already owned the 48 East Property after 
she bought it at the sheriffs sale that she initiated. Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 69(i)(7) Penny held "all right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment 
debtor [James] in and to the property," subject to the right of redemption. 
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The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the Act) allows a creditor to reach 
the assets of a debtor after those assets have been transferred by the debtor to a 
third party, in order to satisfy the debt, if the transfer was fraudulent. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5. The Act was intended to prevent debtors from placing 
their assets beyond the reach of creditors with valid claims against the debtor. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987). It was not intended to 
prevent a debtor from paying his debts. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 369 P.2d 
962, 963-64 (Utah 1962) (holding that a creditor is not defrauded by a debtor's 
payment to another creditor). 
A quick review of the definition of a right of redemption clearly 
demonstrates that the Act is inapplicable to the assignment of a right of 
redemption. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j) allows a debtor, whose assets 
have been sold at a sheriffs sale to satisfy a creditor's claims, to redeem his 
property by paying the creditor an amount equal to the highest bid made at the 
sheriffs sale of the property. The purpose of the right of redemption is "to give 
the debtor an opportunity to pay his debt and salvage his property," and the law 
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should not impede such an outcome. United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506, 508 
(Utah 1976). Additionally, the debtor is allowed to transfer the right of 
redemption. 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 1008 (1998). When a debtor's property is 
redeemed, the creditor is still paid. 
It is clear that the Act cannot apply to the assignment of the right of 
redemption in the present case. Penny is not a creditor because she received the 
money that was due to her upon execution of the lien and the judgment was 
subsequently satisfied. The assignment of the right of redemption, as a matler of 
law, could not have hindered Penny's ability to recover her judgment against this 
property because she elected the amount to bid and accepted the redemption price. 
A. It was Error as a Matter of Law for the Trial Court to Rely upon 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to Declare James 
Brockbank's Assignment of the Right of Redemption Void 
Because Penny is Not a Creditor with a Claim. 
Penny was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and thus, the trial 
court should have denied Penny's motion for summary judgment because the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is inapplicable to James's assignment of the 
right of redemption. The Act defines a creditor as "a person who has a claim," and 
a claim as "a right to payment." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(3), (4). The creditor 
can sue the debtor when the debtor transfers property to put it beyond the reach of 
4
 Although the trial court based its decision on the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act 
(Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq.), common law principles of law, equity, and 
fraud are applicable under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-11, which states, "Unless 
displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including . . . fraud . . . 
supplement this chapter's provisions." 
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the creditor, thereby hindering the creditor's ability to collect on its claim against 
the debtor. Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1 )(a). The assignment of a right of 
redemption is simply not a transfer that can in any way hinder the creditor's ability 
to collect on its claim. The creditor collects when the redemption price is paid. 
The right of redemption is derived from the sale. The purpose of a right of 
redemption is "to give the debtor an opportunity to pay his debt and salvage his 
property." United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 1976). Thus, as long 
as the creditor receives the payment that he is due, it should not matter that the 
debtor is able to keep his property. Because the debt has been paid by the 
redemptioner, the law should not void an assignment of the right of redemption as 
a fraudulent transfer. 
In the present case, Penny claims—and the trial court found—that James's 
assignment of the right of redemption was fraudulent under the Act. The 
argument and court holding is in error because of the following reasons. Penny set 
the amount to be bid at the sheriffs sale and then accepted that bid amount from 
Cheiyl as high bidder. Consequently, as defined by the act, Penny satisfied her 
position as "creditor" and discharged her "claim" by setting and then accepting the 
bid amount of the sheriffs sale. 
1. Penny is not a creditor with respect to the 48 East 
Property because she purchased it at the sheriffs sale. 
Penny's complaint seems to be that the property was redeemed, and 
therefore, the assignment that allowed the redemption to take place must be 
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fraudulent. Such a complaint reveals a lack of understanding of the theories 
underlying execution and redemption. After Penny credit bid $15,000 at the 
sheriffs sale, she became the owner of the 48 East Property, subject to the right of 
redemption. After the sale, James not only had the right to redeem his property by 
paying the redemption price of $15,000 that Penny set with her credit bid at the 
sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property, but he also had the right to transfer this right 
of redemption. 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 1008(1998). Given these rights that the 
law provides to James as a debtor, it is very clear that James's assignment of the 
right of redemption to Cheryl cannot be fraudulent as to Penny, because Penny 
was paid the money that she determined the 48 East Property to be worth through 
her credit bid at the sheriffs sale. 
2. Penny only has claim to the $15,000 which she bid for the 
48 East Property and for which Cheryl redeemed the 
Property. 
It would appear that Penny is crying fraud because she did not receive the 
windfall that she expected when she bid only $15,000 for property which had been 
earlier valued at about $45,000. Instead of making a $30,000 profit, Penny only 
received $15,000. However, this is the risk that a creditor faces when it makes a 
low bid at a sheriffs sale of the debtor's property. Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. 
Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah App. 1990). See also Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)(3) ('The property may be redeemed within six 
months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase") (emphasis added). 
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In Tech-Fluid, Tech-Fluid, the plaintiff creditor, was the sole bidder at a 
sheriffs sale executing a $69,708 mechanics' lien on an oil well owned by the 
debtor, Paiute. Id. at 1330. At the sale, Tech-Fluid only bid $4,000, a small 
fraction of the amount it was owed. Paiute then assigned the right of redemption 
to a third party, Wind River, who redeemed the property at the low price set by 
Tech-Fluid. Tech-Fluid sued the debtor and Wind River claiming, inter alia, that 
Wind River was required to pay the full lien amount before the property could be 
redeemed. IdL at 1330-31. However, the court held that Wind River was entitled 
to redeem the property at the price Tech-Fluid bid. Id at 1335. The court noted, 
"As the only bidder at the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value of the well 
for redemption purposes and placed itself in the predicament it now finds 
itself. . . According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(f)(3) [now Rule 
69(j)(3)] Wind River was only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid [sic] paid 
plus the specified interest." 
Id. at 1335 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, any disappointment that Penny suffered because of the 
assignment of the right of redemption was created by her own actions. She placed 
herself in the predicament in which she now finds herself. Penny, as the sole 
bidder, credit bid $15,000 at the sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property, only a 
fraction of both the property's value and the amount owed her pursuant to the 
supplemental decree.5 Penny was trying to create a windfall by obtaining the 
3
 The amount of the judgment was paid, however. (Record at 860-861.) This was 
pointed out to the trial court. (Record at 502.) 
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property for a fraction of its value while keeping James indebted to her. In her 
effort she found a cooperative friend in the court. 
However, James assigned his right of redemption to Cheryl who redeemed 
the property for the bid amount of $15,000. Like Tech-Fluid, Penny was caught in 
her own game of trying to create a windfall. Upset, she cried fraud (despite 
keeping the $15,000 Cheryl paid to redeem the property and thus forfeiting any 
objection that she may have had). Penny set the redemption price at the sheriffs 
sale, and therefore, she cannot now be heard to complain that the price paid by 
Cheryl—a price that Penny chose—to redeem the property constitutes fraud. 
B. It was Error as a Matter of Law for the Trial Court to Hold that 
the Assignment of the Right of Redemption was Fraudulent 
when James Brockbank Did Not Intend to Hinder, Delay, or 
Defraud Penny by Transferring the Right of Redemption to 
Cheryl Rachele, and as a Matter of Law Could not Hinder, 
Delay, or Defraud Penny. 
The Act states that an allegedly defrauded creditor can recover against a 
debtor when the debtor has acted "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
[the] creditor of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(l)(a). The Act at § 25-6-
5(2) then lists several factors the court may consider to determine "actual intent." 
These factors include whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had 
been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
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(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably 
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer 
was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt 
was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor 
who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
Significantly, "a creditor who claims a debtor transferred property with actual 
intent to defraud under section 25-6-5(1 )(a) must establish that claim by clear and 
convincing evidence." Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah App. 
1999). It is also important to remember that the purpose of a right of redemption 
is to allow a debtor to both pay his debt and retain his property, and the law should 
not inhibit such an outcome. Loosely, 551 P.2d at 508. By looking at what the 
evidence of this case actually demonstrates, it is obvious that James did not 
transfer the right of redemption with the actual intent to defraud Penny. 
First, Cheiyl is not an insider. The only relevant definition that the Act 
gives for "insider" is "a relative of the debtor." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(7)(a). 
The Act goes on to define a "relative" as "an individual related to a spouse, related 
by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a 
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third 
degree." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(11). While Cheryl did at one time maintain a 
relationship with James as "boyfriend and girlfriend," this relationship does not fit 
the definition of an insider according to the Act. Moreover, a transfer between 
17 
people maintaining a close relationship is not necessarily invalid and should not be 
labeled fraudulent if the other facts surrounding the transfer establish its validity. 
Givan v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah 1960) (holding that a transfer to an 
insider is not per se fraudulent, especially when there is a credible explanation for 
the transfer). 
Second, Cheryl has possession and control of the 48 East Property—James 
does not. However, it is important to remember that James did not transfer the 48 
East Property itself to Cheryl; he only assigned his right to redeem that property.6 
Cheryl now owns the 48 East Property because she redeemed it by paying Penny 
the $15,000 that Penny bid at the sheriffs sale of the property. Thus, the Act is 
inapplicable because the "property" that James transferred to Cheiyl—the right of 
redemption—did not impede Penny's ability to collect the money that James owed 
her.7 
6
 While James did execute a warranty deed after the sheriffs sale purporting to 
transfer the 48 East Property to Cheiyl, this deed was a nullity because Penny had 
acquired "all right, title, interest, and claim" in the 48 East Property by purchasing 
it at the sheriffs sale. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(i)(7). In any event, the 
appellate court seemed to rely on the deed for supporting the trial court's ruling of 
contempt and thirty day incarceration order of James. 
7
 Penny argues—and the trial court found—that because James stated that he 
assigned the right of redemption to Cheryl to keep Penny from "trashing" the 
apartments before he could get them back, and because one mortgage payment for 
the 48 East Property was made from James's account, the assignment of the right 
of redemption was fraudulent. Again, it is unclear how this transfer defrauded 
Penny because she received the money due her based upon her own bid. Since the 
purpose of a right of redemption is to allow a debtor to both pay his debts and to 
keep his property, it is not fraudulent as a matter of law for James to make other 
arrangements in respect to the property. 
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Third, James did not abscond, the assignment of the right of redemption 
was not hidden, and the right of redemption was not substantially all of James's 
assets. It is obvious that James could not have hidden the transfer of the right of 
redemption because Penny received the redemption price from Cheryl. Penny 
knew that the transfer had taken place. Moreover, subsequent to the redemption of 
the 48 East Property, James satisfied the underlying judgment which was held by 
Penny by selling other property that he owned—property that had not been 
transferred, and thus, was still in his name. 
Fourth, Cheryl did pay James consideration that was reasonably equivalent 
in value to the right of redemption. Penny, in her argument, confused the right to 
redeem the 48 East Property with the 48 East Property itself. The court also 
confused the two. It is undisputed that Cheryl paid James $50 for the right of 
redemption. Penny and the trial court forget or refuse to understand that the right 
of redemption did not give Cheiyl the 48 East Property—it only gave her the 
"right" to redeem that properly. Cheryl did not have to exercise that right. 
Essentially, Cheryl purchased an option when she paid James $50 for the 
assignment. Cheiyl still had to pay Penny $15,000 to actually gain possession and 
ownership of the properly. This payment was required because subsequent to the 
sheriffs sale Penny was the owner of the property subject only to the right of 
redemption. Because Cheiyl had to pay the full price of the property (i.e. the price 
that Penny had set through her bid at the sheriffs sale along with the statutory 
surcharge and attorney's fees) in order to actually gain ownership of the property, 
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fifty dollars was certainly sufficient consideration to obtain right to redeem the 
property. 
Penny complains that the $15,000 which Cheryl paid for the 48 East 
Property is only a fraction of the actual fair market value of the property. While it 
is true that the property was valued at about $45,000, Penny's own act determined 
the price for which the property could be redeemed. Penny established that price 
by her bid of $15,000 at the sheriffs sale. A creditor who sets the redemption 
price through the bid which he or she makes at the sheriffs sale cannot be heard to 
complain when the property is redeemed at that price. The Supreme Court of Utah 
held this to be true even if the price is only a fraction of the property's market 
value or only a fraction of the amount owed by the debtor to the creditor. Tech-
Fluid Services, 787 P.2d at 1335; See also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)(3) 
OThe property may be redeemed within six months after the sale by paying the 
amount of the purchase") (emphasis added). Penny set the value of the 48 East 
Property for redemption purposes by bidding $15,000 at the sheriffs sale; she 
cannot now complain about the amount required for redemption. 
The above examination of the statutory "badges of fraud" reveals that 
James did not assign the right of redemption to Cheryl with the actual intent to 
defraud Penny. As long as a debtor pays his debts, it is not fraudulent for him to 
show intent towards the disposition of his right of redemption. This is the purpose 
of a right of redemption, Loosely, 551 P.2d at 508, and the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act was not intended to impede such an outcome, Ned J. Bowman, 369 
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P.2d at 963-64. It is easy to conclude that James did not act with the actual intent 
o 
to defraud Penny. 
Rather than rely upon the statutory "badges" of actual intent, the trial court 
apparently relied upon its previous ruling that James's assignment of the right of 
redemption was in contravention of the court's restraining order, which prohibited 
James from conveying or pledging any interest he had in real property. It would 
seem the trial court was implying by this statement that, because James's 
assignment of the right of redemption was allegedly in contravention of the 
restraining order, it was also fraudulent. Ignoring the fact that this implication 
lacks any validity in case law, James's transfer of the right of redemption did not 
violate the court order because a right of redemption is not an interest in real 
property.9 Lavton v. Thavne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th Cir. 1943) ("[A right of 
redemption] is a mere personal privilege rather than an interest or estate in land . . 
Significantly, the trial court made findings contrary to this obvious conclusion 
upon cross-motions for summary judgment. Ignoring the fact that "actual intent" 
to commit fraud must be proved with clear and convincing evidence, Bradford, 
993 P.2d at, 891, the trial court could only find that James acted with actual intent 
to defraud Penny if there were no disputes about the facts that the trial court used 
to make its finding, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). Obviously, there are 
genuine issues of material fact concerning James's intent in assigning the right of 
redemption, and thus, the trial court erred in granting Penny's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. However, this court does not need to remand this proceeding 
to the trial court for decisions on this issue; Section LA and Section II clearly 
demonstrate that as a matter of law Penny's motion should have been denied, 
Cheryl's motion should have been granted, and title quieted to Cheryl. 
9
 This issue has come before this court previously. Appellate No. 980113. In an 
unpublished opinion, however, this court reached its decision on other grounds 
and did not address the issue of whether or not James's assignment of the right of 
redemption was a pledge or transfer of real property. 
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it does not constitute any interest or estate in the real estate itself."). Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 69(i)(7) clearly indicates that the purchaser at a sheriffs sale 
(Penny in this case) receives "all right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment 
debtor [James] in and to the property." By assigning the right of redemption, 
James did not transfer any interest in the 48 East Property since Penny obtained 
"all interest" in the property through her purchase at the sheriffs sale. James only 
assigned a "mere personal privilege." Id. at 289. Since James did not violate the 
court order, the soundness of the trial court's implication dissolves, and it becomes 
very obvious that the assignment of the right of redemption cannot be fraudulent.10 
In summary, the trial court erred in applying the Act to the assignment of 
the right of redemption. Penny received the redemption money to which she was 
entitled and therefore cannot be a creditor with a claim. Moreover, the trial court 
erred in finding that James assigned the right of redemption with the intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud Penny because, as the preceding section has shown, the 
trial court's reliance upon certain "badges of fraud" was misplaced and the court's 
inferences from some of James's other actions were unreasonable. The trial court 
did not understand or refused to recognize that Penny initiated the sheriffs sale 
The trial court took the point of view that James could not have the right of 
redemption. Therefore, Penny, with the court's support, could abuse James as a 
creditor by depriving him of his redemption right. Moreover, the court's 
suggestion that Cheryl get her money from James is repugnant. It reflects a 
hostility for the rule of law, favoritism towards Penny, and complete and total 
disregard for Cheryl's rights. 
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and set the price at which the property was to be sold. The trial court should have 
denied Penny's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CHERYL 
RACHELE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
PENNY WAIVED ANY OBJECTION SHE HAD TO THE 
ASSIGNMENT BY ACCEPTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE PAID 
The undisputed facts clearly indicate that Penny has waived any objection 
she may have had to the assignment of the right of redemption by accepting and 
retaining the redemption price paid by Cheryl. Simply stated, an allegedly 
defrauded party cannot seek rescission of the allegedly fraudulent contract and 
retain the benefit of the performance of the contract.11 The Utah Supreme Court 
has explained that a party claiming fraud has two alternative causes of action that 
he or she may elect in order to recover against another party committing an alleged 
fraud. "The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to elect to rescind the 
transaction and recover the purchase price or to affirm the transaction and recover 
damages." Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). "Any delay on the 
part of the defrauded party, especially his remaining in possession of the property 
received by him under the contract, and dealing with it as his own"" constitutes an 
affirmation of the transaction and a waiver of the right to rescind the contract. Id. 
(emphasis added) (citing Chester v. McDaniel 504 P.2d 726, 727-728 (Or. 1972)). 
11
 Because "[a]n assignment is a contract," and "is subject to the same requisites as 
to validity as other contracts," 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 4, each of the following 
cases apply to the present case, even though they may deal with a contract in 
general and not specifically with an assignment. 
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In Chester, it was further noted that u[t]hese remedies . . . are not concurrent but 
wholly inconsistent. The adoption of one is the exclusion of the other." Id., at 727 
(quoting Scott v. Walton, 52 P. 180, 181 (Or. 1898)). Thus, when a party elects to 
retain the performance delivered by the party alleged to have committed the fraud, 
his or her remedy is limited to the damages caused by the fraud—the defrauded 
party cannot rescind the contract. Id Additionally, when a party claiming fraud 
chooses to rescind the contract, instead of seeking damages, all parties, including 
the party that allegedly committed the fraud, are put back into the position that 
they were in immediately before the allegedly fraudulent action took place. 
Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Penny retained the money Cheryl 
paid when redeeming the 48 East Property. Indeed, Penny even credited her 
judgment against James in the amount of the redemption price, $15,000 - which 
was specifically identified in the May 10, 1999 order (Record at 860-861). 
Despite the identification of this fact, the trial court granted Penny's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, finding that "Third Party Plaintiff did not waive her right to 
challenge Respondent's transfer of [the] 48 East [Property] to Third Party 
Defendant." Findings of Fact ^ 37. This finding is more like a conclusion because 
it contradicts the Utah law that is stated above. By retaining the redemption price 
Cheryl paid, Penny waived any right she had to seek rescission of the assignment 
of the redemption. See Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). Penny 
has not sought damages for the allegedly fraudulent transfer of the right of 
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redemption.12 Also, to seek rescission is precluded since Penny has chosen to 
keep the money that Cheryl paid when redeeming the 48 East Property. 
Instead of declaring the transfer void and allowing Penny to retain the 
money that she received as a result of the transfer, the court should have granted 
Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed Penny's third party complaint, 
and quieted title in the property to Cheryl. In ruling that the transfer was 
fraudulent, it should have considered restoring the right of redemption to James, 
returning the 48 East Property to Penny, and restoring the $15,000 redemption 
price to Cheryl. However, this approach is not possible. The statutory time of 
redemption is strictly construed and it has expired.14 Thus, to truly "undo" the 
12
 Not only has Penny not sought damages, she is not even entitled to recover any 
damages that she may have suffered through the assignment of the right of 
redemption. As discussed above in Section I.A., Penny cannot ciy fraud simply 
because she did not receive the windfall that she expected by bidding only $15,000 
for propeity that was previously valued at over $45,000. Penny set the redemption 
price at the sheriffs sale by bidding $15,000, and she cannot now complain that 
$15,000 is not fair market value for the 48 East Property. Tech-Fluid Services, 
Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah App. 1990); See also 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(j)(3) ("The property may be redeemed within six 
months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase") (emphasis added). 
13
 Essentially, Penny wanted the propeity transferred back to James. The court 
accommodated her desire by ignoring the fact that Penny instigated the sheriffs 
sale, set the bid price, accepted the bid amount, and credited the bid amount 
towards James's debt. The essence of Cheryl's claim is that the court does not 
have jurisdiction to set aside an execution sale where the redemption price has 
been paid to and accepted by the creditor, the creditor's judgment has been 
satisfied, and the redemption period has passed. 
"It is clear that the right of a purchaser at a sheriffs sale either to receive the 
proper redemption amount in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 69(f) 
[now 69(j)] or to have the title perfected at the end of the six-month period is a 
substantive right. Accordingly, strict compliance with the six-month redemption 
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assignment and return the parties to the status quo, the court would have to void 
Penny's crediting James's debt $15,000, order Penny to return $16,653 to Cheryl, 
void the sheriffs sale, return to James the right of redemption, and order James to 
return to Cheryl her payment for the redemption right. 
The trial court attempts to remedy its clearly erroneous application of the 
law by stating that if Cheryl wants a refund of the money that she paid to Penny, 
she must sue James. It is unclear how Cheryl has a cause of action against James 
when Penny is the individual that was paid the redemption price and retains the 
benefit of the redemption. 
The trial court's ruling was contrary to law of redemption even though the 
law of redemption was clearly explained to the court. The case of Tech-Fluid 
Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc.. 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah App. 1990) 
deals with the issue presented here. The trial court completely ignored Cheryl's 
rights when it suggests that she sue James to get the money paid to Penny for the 
redemption. Only this court can remedy the total disregard of Cheryl's rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Cheryl Rachele respectfully requests this court to reverse the trial court's 
finding that James's assignment of the right of redemption was fraudulent, to grant 
Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment, to dismiss Penny's third party 
complaint, and to quiet title to the 48 East Property in Cheryl Rachele. The 
period is normally required." Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1991) 
(footnotes omitted). 
26 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act does not apply to the present case because Penny 
was paid the redemption money determined by her own sale and because James, as 
a matter of law, could not have intended to hinder, delay, or defraud Penny. Also, 
Penny, as a matter of law, cannot be a creditor within the meaning of the Act. If 
she deemed to be a creditor, the right of redemption is meaningless. James did not 
assign the right of redemption to hinder Penny's ability to recover on her judgment 
against James. Moreover, the trial court erred by rescinding the assignment of the 
right of redemption, allowing Penny to keep the redemption money, and directing 
Cheiyl to James for recovery of her money. 
Dated th is<^day of September, 2000. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BRENT D. YOUNG, Attorney for Appellant 
?^v 
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A. Utah Code Annotated 25-6-2. Definitions. 
A 
l"^4h-l. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or ol'n yeneial paunei .it'lhc dc*bi<u 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, related by 
consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a spouse, and 
includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree. 
II,
 I M | | nl , Brockbank, Memorandum Decision 
B 
CF A25ZALS 
FILED 
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Aooe l ian : 
GXZZ^T.N C CD, ? r e s i d ing Judg e : 
The t r i a l cour t i s s u e d an o r d e r which " r e s t r a i n e d and 
e n j o i n e d [ a p p e l l a n t ] from, t a k i n g any a c t i o n to convey or p ledge 
any of t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y awarded h i en by t h e Supplemental Decree . " 
A p p e l l a n t s u b s e q u e n t l y conveyed a r i g h t of redemption and 
con temporaneous ly e x e c u t e d a w a r r a n t y de-ad conveying h i s 
r e m a i n i n g i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o p e r t y . A p p e l l a n t argues t h e 
conveyance of h i s r i g h t of r edempt ion d i d not v i o l a t e t h e c o u r t 
o r d e r because a r i g h t of r e d e m p t i o n i s no t an i n t e r e s t in 
p r o p e r t y s u b j e c t to t h e o r d e r . As d i s c u s s e d in Knickerbocker . . 
Cannon, 912 P. 2d 95 3 (Utah 1996) , t h e purpose of the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s o r d e r was " to p r e v e n t t h e p a r t i e s from removing the 
m a r i t a l a s s e t s from t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the [ t r i a l ] c o u r t . " I d . 
a t 975 . A p p e l l a n t ' s u se of a w a r r a n t y deed to convey an i n t e r e s t 
m p r o p e r t y i s ev idenced by t h e language of t h e deed: "JAMES L. 
5R0CK3ANX, g r a n t o r of P r i c e , County of Carbon, hereby conveys and 
w a r r a n t s t o " . . " Cf. S t u c k i v . E l l i s , 114 Utah 43S, 201 P.2d 
43S, 490 (1949) ( s t a t i n g b e s t method t o convey p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t 
i s by deed) ; see a l s o Utah Code Ann., § 57-1-12 (1994) (governing 
form cf w a r r a n t y deed: "Conveyances cf l and may be s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g form . . . "} . Thus, t h e t r i a l cou r t was 
j u s t i f i e d i n f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t in contempt fo r v i o l a t i n g i t s 
o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g him from conveying h i s r e a l p r o p e r t y , and we 
need not determine whether appellant also violated the order by 
conveying his right cf redemption. 
Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion 
by ordering him to serve sixty days in jail1 or obtain a 
reconveyance of the property from the third party grantee in 
order to purge the contempt finding. In other wcrds, appellant 
could choose no either serve time in jail, or he could purge the 
contempt finding by obtaining the property back from the third 
party to whom he conveyed it--thus restoring the status quo. 
Appellant chose to serve thirty days in jail,2 and thus he is no 
longer subject to the court's second alternative that he obtain a 
reconveyance in order tc purge the contempt. Because the trial 
courtls contempt order has been satisfied, the trial court cannot 
impose any further penalties for that contempt and cannot mandate 
that the parties take any further action. Therefore, this court 
can provide no relief affecting the rights of the parties, and 
the issue is moot. See Winters v. Schuiman, 1999 UT App 119,1|ll, 
977 P.2d 1213, cert, denied, 994 P. 2d 1271 (Utah 1999)**. 
Finally, appellee cross-appeals the trial court's award of 
attorney fees, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to award her the entire amount cf her requested fees. 
In her brief, appellee cites no authority supporting her 
position. We "'decline to consider an argument that a party has 
failed to adequately brief. f " State v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 
2,^11, 974 P.2"d 269 (citation omitted). 
1. Under section 78-32-10, "the court may impose a fine not 
exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county 
jail not exceeding 30 days, or both.'1 Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10 
(1996). The parties dispute whether the court had authority to 
impose a longer sentence because it found appellant in contempt 
on multiple grounds. 
2. At oral argument, counsel stated that the trial court reduced 
the sixty day sentence to thirty days, and that appellant had 
served thirty days in jail. 
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BENCH and ORML U concur. 
TECH-FLUID SERVICE?., IM , 
Plaintiff and VppelianL 
i \\\\ W OPERATING. IN< , Paiute 
i hi & Mining Corp., H al.. 
Defendants and Respondents 
No. 890067-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb 16 1990 
Assignee of bankrupt debtor's right of 
redemption in oil well against which me-
TECH-FLUID SERV. v. CAVILAN OPERATING Utah 1329 
Cite as 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990) 
chanics' lien had been filed exercised its 
redemption right. Holder of mechanics' 
lien challenged the redemption. The Sev-
enth District Court, Duchesne County, 
Dennis L. Draney, J., held that the redemp-
tion was valid. Holder appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme. J., held that: (1) 
the bankruptcy trustee abandoned her 
right of redemption when she abandoned 
the well; (2) assignee properly redeemed 
the well: and (3) holder could not execute 
on the redemption right. 
Affirmed. 
4. Mechanics' Liens <s=3299 
Substantial compliance with procedural 
requirements of redemption rule is suffi-
cient. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 6915H2V 
5. Mechanics' Liens @»299 
Where assignee of redemption right 
substantially complied with procedural re-
quirements of redemption rule after fore-
closure of mechanics' lien, and foreclosure 
sale purchaser failed to demonstrate any 
prejudice from assignee's failure to strictly 
adhere to requirements of that rule, re-
demption was valid. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 
69(fH2). 
1. Bankruptcy <5=s3135 
Bankruptcy trustee was not required 
to explicitly abandon her right of redemp-
tion in foreclosed property for it to revert 
to debtor and, thus, when court ordered 
trustee to abandon her interest in well, 
right of redemption reverted to debtor: 
therefore, debtor's assignment of that 
right was valid. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 
69(f), (f)(1), (f){'2){2). 
2. Mechanics' Liens <3=J299 
Right to redeem property sold upon 
foreclosure of mechanics' lien is such that 
it can be only exercised after property has 
been sold at foreclosure sale, and only 
those with interest in property at time oi 
sale (or their successors in interest) have 
right to redeem. Rules Civ.Proc Rule 
69(f)(1). 
6. Clerks of Courts <s=>67 
Mechanics* Liens <s=3307 
Upon foreclosure of mechanics' lien, if 
proceeds from foreclosure sale are inade-
quate to pay entire amount determined in 
foreclosure judgment, clerk must, as mere 
ministerial duty, enter deficiency judgment 
against debtor, however, without initial 
foreclosure judgment, clerk cannot enter 
deficiency judgment and absent such judg-
ment he or she cannot properly issue writ 
of execution. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 69(a-e). 
3. Mechanics' Liens 3=299 
In evaluating necessity for strict com-
pliance with redemption statutes after fore-
closure of mechanics' lien, court focuses 
upon nature of statutory requirements and 
likelihood of prejudice; if failure to adhere 
to requirements will affect substantive 
right of one of parties and possibly preju-
dice that party, courts require strict compli-
ance, but, if requirements are merely pro-
cedural and will not prejudice one of par-
ties, substantial compliance is sufficient. 
Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 69(f)(2). 
7. Mines and Minerals <3=»lIT 
Holder of mechanics' lien was not enti-
tled to execute upon assignee's redemption 
right; holder failed to first obtain fore-
closure judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
69(a-e). 
S. Mines and Minerals 3=117 
Where holder of mechanics' lien on oil 
well purchased that well at foreclosure sale 
for $4,000, assignee of right of redemption 
was only required to pay $4,000 plus 67<> 
interest to redeem property; assignee was 
not required to pay entire amount of al-
leged debt. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 69(f)(3). 
Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae, 
Vernal, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Clark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeach-
nie. Vernal, for defendants and respon-
dents. 
Before JACKSON, and ORME. JJ.. 
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and BULLOCK, lor District Judge. 
ORME. Judge: 
Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. ap-
peals from an adverse ruling concerning 
the redemption of property it purchased at 
a sheriffs sale. We affirm. 
FACTd 
Paiute Oil and Mining Corporation, the 
predecessor of respondent Gavilan Operat-
ing, Inc., had an ownership interest in an 
oil and gas well located in Duchesne Coun-
ty. Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. 
supplied services and materials to the well 
for which it was not paid. In November 
1984, it filed a mechanics' lien on the well 
claiming that $69,708 was owing. In Janu-
ary 1985. Tech-Fluid commenced an action 
to foreclose its lien naming Paiute and sev-
eral other entities as defendants. 
In December 1985, Paiute filed a volun-
tary reorganization petition under chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee was 
subsequently appointed. In February 
1986. the state district court entered a 
judgment of foreclosure as against all of 
the defendants in the lien action except 
Paiute. Because of the pending bankrupt-
cy, the district court specifically declined to 
adjudicate the claim as between Paiute and 
Tech-Fluid. 
In May 198T, Tech-Fluid obtained an or-
der lifting the automatic stay as it applied 
to the lien action and ordering the trustee 
" to abandon her interest in the well. There-
after. Tech-Fluid obtained an order from 
the district court directing the sale of Pai-
ute's interest in the well. No judgment of 
foreclosure against Paiute was ever en-
tered or docketed prior to the court-ordered 
sale, a procedure which, while unorthodox, 
was never objected to by any party. A 
sheriffs sale of the well was held on July 
2, 1987. Tech-Fluid was the only bidder at 
the sale and purchased the property with a 
84,000 credit bid. 
1. J Robert Bullock. Senior District Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
In the fall of 19ST. Tech-Fluid discovered 
that Paiute intended to assign its redemp-
tion right. Tech-Fluid demanded a quit-
claim deed, but Paiute refused. On Decem-
ber 14, 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained from the 
county clerk a writ of execution instructing 
the sheriff to execute on Paiute's redemp-
tion right. A public sale of the redemption 
right was set for January 5, 1988. 
On December 31. 1987, Paiute assigned 
its redemption right to Wind River Re-
sources Corporation. On January 1, 1988, 
the final day of the redemption period, 
Wind River exercised the right of redemp-
tion by delivering to the sheriffs office of 
Duchesne County 1^  an inadequately nota-
rized copy of the assignment of Paiute's 
right of redemption; 2) an acknowledged 
notice of redemption setting forth the cal-
culation of the redemption amount, the 
property to be redeemed, and the basis for 
its right to redeem; and 3) a cashier's 
check in the amount of $4,310. The sheriff 
issued a sheriffs redemption certificate to 
Wind River. 
On January 5 and 6. Tech-Fluid attempt-
ed to proceed with the scheduled execution 
sale and purchase the redemption right. 
However, the sheriff would not accept 
Tech-Fluid's bid until the district court de-
termined whether a redemption ngni eouid 
be subject to execution. 
On January 8. Tech-Fluid obtained an 
order directing the sheriff to show cause 
why he should not issue his deed to Tech-
Fluid because of an invalid redemption by 
Wind River. The district court subsequent-
ly held a hearing on the order to show 
cause and ruled that 1) the assignment was 
valid, 2) the right of redemption could not 
be executed upon, 3) Wind River was enti-
tled to redemption because it substantially 
complied with the statutory requirements 
for redemption, and 4) Tech-Fluid had no 
further interest in the well. Tech-Fluid 
filed a further motion, claiming that Wind 
River was required to pay not only the 
Code Ann. § 7S-3-2-H10) (1989). 
- . .. u r . f n . A ^ urt,KATING Utah 1 3 3 1 
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$4,000 but the entire amount of the lien. 
The motion was denied and the court 
signed its conclusions of law and order. 
Tech-Fluid brought this appeal. 
On appeal Tech-Fluid raises several ar-
guments. First, it argues that, although 
the trustee abandoned the well, she did not 
abandon the right to redeem the well in the 
event of foreclosure. If this were true, the 
assignment from Paiute to Wind River 
would be invalid because Paiute would 
have had no interest in the redemption 
right, which would have been held, until its 
expiration, by the trustee. Second, Tech-
Fluid argues that the court erred in holding 
that it could not execute on the redemption 
right. Third, it argues that the redemption 
was unsuccessful because Wind River 
failed to strictly comply with the redemp-
tion statute. Finally, Tech-Fluid argues 
that Wind River was required to pay the 
entire amount of the lien before it could 
redeem the property. 
ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT OF 
REDEMPTION 
Tech-Fluid argues that the trustee never 
abandoned her r.ght to redeem the well : 
and therefore Paiute had no right which it 
couid assign to Wind River. On the other 
hand. Gavilan. as successor to Paiute. ar-
gues that when the trustee abandoned her 
interest in the weil. she necessar.lv aban-
doned any right to redeem which might 
arise in the event of foreclosure. The trial 
court heard arguments from counsel at the 
order to show cause hearing. Subsequent 
to the hearing, the parties suomitted mem-
oranda to support their positions. The 
court ruled that the trustee had abandoned 
the well long before the redemption right 
arose. The evidence and the law support 
the district court's conclusion and therefore 
we affirm. 
[1] Tech-Fluid concedes that a right of 
redemption is a property interest.3 More-
over, it is clear that upon the riling of the 
bankruptcy proceeding, the entire ''bundle 
of rights" Paiute had in the well, including 
its right to redeem in the event of any sale 
subject to Utah R.Civ.P. 69, see note 3, 
supra, became part of the bankruptcy es-
tate.4 However, we do not agree that the 
trustee had to explicitly abandon her right 
of redemption for it to revert to the debt-
or.5 any more than she had to explicitly 
abandon other rights of ownership, such as 
the right to collect royalties or the right to 
explore and develop or even the right of 
possession. 
According to the bankruptcy code, ''the 
court may order the trustee to abandon any 
property of the estate that is burdensome 
to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value and benefit to the estate." II U.S.C. 
§ 554(b) (1989). Courts and commentators 
, It is notewor:h\ :nat the trustee ne\er claimed 
she had somehow retained the right to redeem 
Paiute b interest .n the weil. On the contrary, 
we are presented with her affidavit stating she 
always considered the redemption ngnt aban-
doned right alone with the weil. However, that 
affidavit was not submitted to the tnai court, is 
introduced tor the first time on appeal, and. 
therefore, is not part of the record properly 
before u*. Accordingly, it plays no part in our 
decision. 
3. A right of redemption is created m Utah by 
Rule 6<H0 of the Utah Rules oi Civil Procedure 
which provides, m pertinent part, that "(proper-
ty sold subject to redemption, or any part sold 
separately, may be redeemed by the following 
persons or their successors in interest: (I) the 
judgment debtor " Utah R.Civ.P 69(0(1). 
"Successors in interest" clearlv include assign-
ees. See Utah R.Civ.P. o9(0(:H:). 
4. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate 
ib created which includes "ail .egal or equitable 
interests of the deotor in property as of the 
commencement of the case." II U.S.C. § 541 
(1979). According to Collier. "(a]n equity of 
redemption comes within the scope of 'all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in proper-
ty.' " 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 
r
'541.07ft 1 (15th ed. 1989) (quoting 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541 (1979)) See aLo Layton v. Layton. 105 
Utah I. UO P2d 759, 761 (1*43) 
5. Tech-Fluid relies upon § 554(d) of the bank-
ruptcy code which states that property oi the 
estate that is not abandoned and that is not 
administered remains property of the es-
tate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (19S9). 
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e recognized that once abandoned, "the 
perty stands as if no bankruptcy had 
m filed and the debtor enjoys the same 
im to it and interest in it as he held 
svious to the filing of bankruptcy." In 
Cmseturner. S B.R. 581, 591 (D. Utah 
81) (emphasis added). "Thus, abandon-
e e constitutes a divestfiturej of all in-
'rests in property that were property of 
le estate." 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bank-
uptcy 1 554.02[2] (15th ed. 1989) (emphasis 
,dded). 
us, the Fourth Circuit has at least stated in 
dicta that when the trustee abandons her 
interest in property of the estate. "the 
property and the right of redemption re-
mains in. or reverts to. the bankrupt." In 
re Webb. 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 (4th Cir.1932). 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 
the redemption right belonged to Paiute 
after the well was abandoned, and that 
Paiute could properly assign that right to 
Wind River. 
[2] The trial court's conclusion in this 
:ase is consistent with Cruseiurner and 
Collier. We see no reason why the right to 
redeem should be treated differently than 
any other property interest that the trustee 
has in the property prior to abandonment. 
On the contrary, it would be anomalous to 
view the right of redemption as an indepen-
dent property interest which stayed with 
the trustee when she abandoned the prop-
erty to which it pertained. The right to 
redeem is such that it can only be exercised 
after property has been sold at a fore-
closure sale, and only those with an inter-
est in the property at the time of the sale 
(or their successors in interest) have a right 
to redeem. See Utah R.Civ.P. 69(f)(1). See 
also Layton v. Thayne. 133 F.2d 2S7, 2S9 
(10th Cir.1943), cert, denied, 323 U.S. 786, 
65 S.Ct. 277. 89 L.Ed. 627 (1944). It is 
inconsistent to suggest that a trustee, hav-
ing abandoned property and consequently 
being divested of all interest therein, would 
still retain a right to redeem, at least ab-
sent some expressed and unambiguous in-
tent by the trustee to retain that right.6 
We hold, therefore, that "divestiture of all 
interests in the property" includes divesti-
ture of the trustee's right to redeem. 
Tech-Fluid points to no compelling au-
thority inconsistent with the trial court's 
and our conclusion. On the other hand, 
although our attention has been drawn to 
no case deciding the precise issue before 
6. We need not decide whether the trustee could 
have specifically retained the right to redeem 
the property even while abandoning the proper-
ty. The trustee in this case chose not to attempt 
COMPLIANCE WITH 
REDEMPTION STATUTE 
The district court concluded that Wind 
River had only to comply substantially, 
rather than strictly, with the requirements 
oi Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court also concluded that 
Wind River had substantially complied with 
those requirements. We agree on both 
scores. 
Rule 69(f)(2) provides that, at the time of 
redemption. 
the redemptioner must produce to the 
officer or person from whom he seeks to 
redeem, and serve with his notice to the 
officer: (1) a certified copy of the docket 
of the judgment under which he claims 
the right to redeem, or. if he redeems 
upon a mortgage or other lien, a memo-
randum of the record thereof certified by 
the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly 
acknowledged or proved where the same 
is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an 
affidavit by himself or his agent showing 
the amount then actually due on the lien. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 69(f)(2). 
Tech-Fluid argues that the trial court 
erred when it applied a substantial compli-
ance test to determine whether Wind River 
had properly redeemed. Tech-Fluid cites 
Mollerup v. Storage Sys. Int'i 569 P.2d 
1122 (Utah 1977), and argues that strict 
compliance with the statutory requirements 
to retain that right, see note 2, supra, and in the 
absence of any indication to that effect, the 
right to redeem automatically passed to Paiute 
upon abandonment of the well. 
TECH-FLLID SERV. v. GAVILAN OPERATING Utah 1 3 3 3 
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was necessary In Mollerup, the Utah Su-
preme Court stated that "[t]he nght of 
redemption has long been recognized as a 
SUDS tan tive ngnt to be exercised in strict 
accord aritn statutory terms " Id at 1124. 
Gavilan, on the other hand, argues that 
substantial compliance with the require-
ments of Rule 69(f)(2) was sufficient under 
United Scates v Loosley, 551 P 2d 506 
(Utah 1976) In Loosley, tne Court stated 
that 
statutes dealing with redemption are re-
garded as remedial in character and 
snouid be given liberal construction and 
application to permit a property owner 
wno can pay his deots to do so, and thus 
maKe his creditor whole, and save his 
property Therefore, if a deotor, acting 
m good faitn. has suostantxally com-
plied with the procedural requirements 
of the rule m such a manner that the 
lender mortgagee is not injured or ad-
versely arfectea, and 's getting what he 
is entitled to the law will not aid in 
depriMng the mortgagor of ms property 
for mere faihng short of exact compli-
ance with technicalities 
la at 508 ^emphasis aaaed) 
[3] Mollerca and Loobieu though 
seemmgK inconsistent are >*eadilv recon-
cued Very simolv not all ^edemotion pro-
vsions are a \e Courts n evaluating the 
necessity tor atrct comoharce in these 
kmds or cases focus upon the nature of 
the statutor requirements ana the likeli-
hood or prejudice If fauure to adhere to 
the requirements* will arfect a substantive 
ngnt of one or the parties and possibly 
prejudice that part\ then courts require 
strict compliance On the other hand, if 
the requirements are merelv procedural 
and will not prejudice one of the parties 
suostantial compliance is sufficient 
The Washington Supreme Court ad-
dressed these distinctions directlv in Gesa 
Fed Credit Union i M dual Lire Ins Co 
105 Wash 2d 248 713 P 2d 723 731-33 
(1986) (en banc) The Gesa court recog 
mzed that the Wasnmgton redemption stat 
ute evolved a number oi provisions, some 
which confer a statutory nght and 
some of wtuch establish a procedure by 
which that nght is perfected 'A stat-
ute is remedial wnen it relates to practice, 
procedure, or remedies and does not affect 
a suDStantive or vested right' ' 713 ? 2d 
at 732 (quoting Mzeoack v Colasurdo. 102 
Wasn 2d TO 685 P 2d 1074, 1081 (1984)). 
The Gesa court went on to hold that the 
technical failure involved m that case was 
harmless because the failure did not affect 
a suDStantive nght and appellant was not 
prejudiced Id. at 732-33 See also House-
hold Fin Corp v Bacon, 58 Or App 267, 
648 P 2d 421, 423 (1982) (technical inconsis-
tencies with statutory requirements did not 
adversely affect nghts of purchaser) 
Our Supreme Court m Mollerup was 
construing Rule 69(f)(3) which sets a time 
limit of six months in which redemption 
must be made This provision clearly af-
fects a substantive right of the purer aser. 
All right, title and interest m the proDerty 
do not vest in the purchaser at a fore-
closure sale antil the redemption period has 
expired Local Realty Co v Linaquist, 96 
Utan 29- 85 P 2d 770, ~72 (1938) [T]he 
interest of the purcnaser is [mere ^ ] an 
equitable interest, suoject to be io»t or 
canceUed or taken awav ov the deotor or 
anv redemotioner or their assigns upon 
pavment or the sale prce with interest.' 
^5 P 2a at ~~2 It the**e is no redemption 
within the prescribed perod. the ourcnaser 
is then entitled to a conveyance or the 
property Utah R Civ P 69(f)(5^ To allow 
redemption oeyond the sivmonth pe-'od in-
evitably compromises and prejudices the 
purchaser a interest Consequent^ the 
Court concluded that absent some s gmfi-
cant tacts to 'move the conscience of the 
Court it would not extend the redemption 
oenod Mollerup 5b9 P 2d at 1124 
Loobley like the case before us involved 
Rule 69(f)(2) A brief recitation of the 
facts m Loosley is helpful The Loosleys 
failed to pay a government loan The 
government then toreclosed on a property 
interest of the Loosle\s At a foreclosure 
1334 Viah TJ " *'^ ' ' "T'^ORTKR. 2d SERIES 
sale, the Griffiths purchased the property 
interest. The Loosieys then assigned their 
right of redemption to the Hammons who 
further assigned the right to Basic Invest-
ment. Inc. One day prior to the six-month 
redemption period, Basic served a notice of 
redemption on the Griffiths' attorney, ac-
companied with a check for the correct 
redemption amount. They did not serve 
any of the documents specified m Rule 
69(f)(2). Eight days after the tender, the 
Griffiths returned the check and rejected 
the tender based upon Basic's failure to 
comply with Rule 69(f)(2). 
The trial court m Loosley concluded that 
because Basic had failed to adhere to the re-
quirements of Rule 69(f)(2), their redemp-
tion failed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed. It recognized than the fail-
ure to comply with the technical require-
ments of Rule 69(f)(2) had no adverse ef-
fects on the Griffiths. 551 P.2d at 508. It 
then held that since the assignment, were 
proper. Basic had tendered the correct 
amount within the prescribed time, and the 
Griffiths had failed to object, the redemp-
tion was good. Id. 
[4.5] Based upon the authority dis-
cussed above, and in particular Loosley, we 
affirm that substantial compliance is the 
proper test under Rule 69(f)(2). Moreover, 
because the Court found substantial com-
pliance in Loosley, we are obliged to find it 
in this case. Tech-Fluid's position is even 
weaker than the Griffiths' position was in 
Loosley. Wind River not only tendered the 
correct amount within the redemption peri-
od but also tendered some proof of the 
assignment between Paiute and Wind River 
and a document entitled "Notice of Re-
demption" giving additional facts about its 
entitlement to redeem. Although Wind 
7 W md River could have complied more fully m 
several respects. Although there was no judg-
ment docketed. Wind River could have sub-
mitted a copy of the court order directing sale 
of the well. Moreover, there are no facts in the 
record to suggest an excuse for the inadequate 
notarization of the assignment. Finally, Wind 
River could surely have submitted an affidavit 
stating the alleged amount due on the hen 
River could surely nave aone more to com-
ply with the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2)/ 
it complied more fully than did the defen-
dants in Loosley. Additionally, as in Loos-
ley, Tech-Fluid did not challenge the validi-
ty of the tender until several days after the 
tender and after the redemption period had 
run 
The requirements at issue in this case 
are identical to those in Loosley. They are 
procedural in nature and do not affect any 
substantive rights of the purchaser.* 
Tech-Fluid has failed to demonstrate any 
prejudice from the failure to strictly adhere 
to the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2). Con-
sequently, we affirm the district court's 
holding that Wind River substantially com-
plied with the redemption provisions and 
that such compliance is all that is neces-
sary. 
EXECUTION .. . riEDEMPTION RIGHT 
Having concluded that Wind River other-
wise properly redeemed, we now address 
whether Tech-Fluid could execute upon 
Paiute's redemption right. We hold that it 
could not. 
Wre need not address the more general 
issue of whether a judgment creditor could 
ever execute upon the judgment debtor's 
right of redemption because Tech-Fluid 
failed to obtain a foreclosure judgment 
upon which a post-foreclosure sale deficien-
cy judgment could be based and absent 
such judgment, there was nothing on which 
any execution could be premised. When 
Tech-Fluid received relief from the auto-
matic stay regarding the well, tt immediate-
ly proceeded to obtain an order from the 
district court to sell Paiute's interest in the 
well. In its haste, Tech-Fluid did not first 
obtain a foreclosure judgment determining 
the correcf amount owing 
8. The procedural rules of 69(fX2) were likely 
created for the benefit and protection of the 
sheriff, so that he may be guided in what to 
require to make certain that redemption is in 
order. See. e.£.. Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon, 
58 Or.App. 267, 548 P.2d 421, 423 (1982). 
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[6] Under a normal foreclosure scenar-
io,9 the judgment: creditor first obtains a 
foreclosure judgment determining the cor-
rect amount due and owning. Then, prop-
err/ subject to the judgment is sold at a 
foreclosure sale. See Utah R.Civ.P. 69(a)-
(e). If the proceeds from the sale are inad-
equate to pay the entire amount deter-
mined in the foreclosure judgment, "[t]he 
clerk must, as a mere ministerial duty, 
enter a deficiency judgment against the 
[debtor]." First Nat'l Bank v. HaymoncL 
39 Utah 151. 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936). 
Without an initial foreclosure judgment, 
the clerk has no basis upon which to calcu-
late a deficiency. Thus, the clerk cannot 
enter a deficiency judgment and absent 
such a judgment he or she cannot properly 
issue a writ of execution. Consequently, 
the clerk in this case improperly issued the 
writ of execution. 
[7] Tech-Fluid should not now be heard 
to complain. It chose its own course of 
action by failing to first obtain a fore-
closure judgment. We hold that Tech-
Flmd was not entitled to execute upon Pai-
ute s redemption ngntz 
purchase was made, the amount of such 
lien, with interest. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 69(f)(3) (emphasis added). 
Tech-Fluid does not claim to have had any 
lien on the well other than the one which 
permitted the original foreclosure sale. 
Under the express language of the statute, 
therefore, it was only entitled to the 
amount of the purchase bid plus six per-
cent interest. See Madsen, Equitable Con-
siderations of Mortgage Foreclosure and 
Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedi-
al Legislation, 1976 Utah L.Rev. 327. 343-
44. 
Once again, Tech-Fluid is bound by its 
choices, including the decision to bid only 
34.000 on the well. As the only bidder at 
the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value 
of the well for redemption purposes and 
placed itself in the predicament it now 
finds itself. See Knes v. Allen Carpet, 
Inc.. 146 Ariz. 348, 706 P.2d 360, 363-64 
(1985) (en banc); Johnson v. Zahn. 380 111. 
320. 44 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1942). According to 
Ruie 69(f)(3), Wind River was only obligat-
ed to pay what Tech Fluid paid plus the 
specified interest. 
AMOUNT OF REDEMPTION 
[8] Finally, Tech-Fluid argues that 
Wind River was obligated to pay not only 
the amount of the bid but the entire 
amount of the alleged debt. Ruie 69(f)(3) 
provides in pertinent part: 
The property may be redeemed from the 
purchaser . . on paying the amount of 
his purchase with 6 percent thereon in 
addition . . and. if the purchaser is also 
a creditor having a Hen prior to that of 
the person seeking redemption, other 
than the judgment under which said 
9. The mechanics' lien statute specifically pro-
vides that mechanics' liens are foreclosed in the 
same manner, and subject to the *ame right or 
redemDtion. as in the case of mortgages. Std 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (1988). 
10. Having based our conclusion on Tech-Fluid's 
failure to obtain a foreclosure judgment, we do 
not mean to suggest that Tech-Fluid would have 
prevailed had thib fact been otherwise. There is 
apparently little ca*e law addressing the issue of 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the rulings of the district 
court and hold that: I) The trustee aban-
doned her right of redemption when she 
abandoned the well; 2} Wind River sub-
stantially complied with the technical re-
quirements of Rule 69(f)(2) and therefore 
properly redeemed; 3) having failed to ob-
tain a foreclosure judgment, Tech-Fluid 
could not execute on the redemption right; 
and 4) Wind River was only obligated un-
der Rule 69(f)(3) to tender the amount of 
the purchase plus interest. 
whether a mortgage creditor may execute on the 
redemption right of the mortgage debtor. How-
ever. Gavilun directs our attention to Johnson v. 
Zahn, 380 III. 320. 44 N.E.2d 15 (1942). In 
Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a 
lien did not attach to the judgment debtor's 
equity of redemption arising from the judgment 
creditor's deficiency judgment. 44 N.E.2d at 19. 
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JACKSON, J., and J. ROBERT 
BULLOCK, Senior District Judge, 
concur. 
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D. United States v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). 
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UNITED STATES of America. Plaintiff, 
v 
George B LOOSLEY, dba Farmers Supply 
Company et al Defendants and 
Appellants, 
v 
Sterling GRIFFITHS and Donna Griffiths. 
his wife. Purchasers at Sheriff's 
Sale and Respondents. 
No. 14247 
Supreme Court of Utah 
June 13 1076 
United States
 3mall business adminis-
tration brougnt a toreclosu'-e acron on a 
service station arte** the mortgagors taned 
to repa> a loan \ssig^ees ot the mortga-
gors' interest appealed trom a ruling of the 
Fit th District Court, Iron Count}, J Ha" 
Ian Burns J that their attempt to redeem 
the property trom purchase-* at the she" 
i t f i sale was invalid The Supreme Court 
Crockett J , held that wne^e the assignee* 
tende red the correct amour: due for re-
demotion to the purchase-s attorney one 
day before the redemption period expired 
and the purchasers did not then indicate 
any ground whatsoever for rejecting the 
s ir 
~or*e ' -"^ u m aw Goes not 
3 Mortgages 0=380 
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wriLn it standi a^  secu^tv and ne'the" 
mortgage "or rorec'osure should De used as 
mst-ame~: ot oooression 
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dempt.or ot prope"t\ are "egarded a^ re-
media ^ nature ard snould be given Uoer-
al co^s - c or ard aoo ication to permit 
prooe"'\ ow^e" who car oay his deots to 
QO so and tuus make his c-eaitor w i d e 
a*^ d ^a\ e hi* orooe"t> Rules ot C vil Pro-
cedure - ne o°ii)(2) 
5 Mortgages 0 = 6 0 8 
I- aeotor acting m good faith, has 
substa *t alh comohed \\ th proceaural re-
quirements ot redemption rule in buch 
man^e- f a t le^de" mortgagee is not in-
jured 0" ad\ e"sely atrected and is getting 
wnat he is entitled to law will not aid m 
depru ng mortgagor ot his property for 
me-e tabling snort of exact compliance 
with technicality Rules of Civil Proce-
dure rule o9{i)[2) 
6. Mortgages §=»608 
Where assignees of mortgagors ten-
dered correct amount due for redemption 
of property to attorney for purchasers at 
sheriff's sale one day before redemption 
period expired and purchasers did not indi-
cate any ground whatsoever for rejecting 
tender, purchasers waived objections that 
check was delivered to wrong person and 
should have been delivered to purchasers 
or to sheriff, that certified copy of docket 
of judgment or memorandum of record 
was not presented with check and that no 
affidavit was presented showing amount 
actually due on lien. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 69(f)(2). 
Lauren N. Beasley, of Cotro-Manes, 
Warr, Fankhauser & Beasley, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants-appellants. 
Michael W. Park, Cedar City, for re-
spondents. 
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fiths asked Mr. Park if they had to accept 
the money or if there was any ground for 
rejecting it. Mr. Park stated, in substance, 
that he would look into the matter. Eight 
days later, on June 20, 1975, Mr. Park re-
turned the check to Basic Investment with 
a letter which included: 
Enclosed herewith please find a check 
for $10,706 made out to Sterling Grif-
fiths with the purchaser listed as Basic 
Investment Corporation. 
My clients have requested that I re-
turn that check to you for the reason 
that a certified copy of the docket of 
Judgment or a memorandum of record 
was not presented with the check, nor 
was an affidavit presented showing the 
amount actually due on the lien. 
Also, my client claims that the check 
was delivered to the wrong person and 
should have been delivered to himself or 
the Sheriff. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
The United States (Small Business Ad-
ministration") brought a foreclosure action 
on a service station at Cedar City after the 
lessors, George and Theodean Loosley, 
failed to repay a Small Business Adminis-
tration loan. 
Defendants Sterling and Donna Grif-
fiths bid in and purchased the mortgagee's 
interest m the property at the sheriff's sale 
held on December 13, 1974. Subsequently, 
the Loosleys had assigned their interest to 
the defendants, Marion and Gladys Ham-
mon, and the Hammons thereafter assigned 
their rights of redemption to defendant, 
Basic Investment, Inc., (hereinafter re-
ferred to as defendants). The latter ap-
peals from a ruling of the district court 
that its attempt to redeem was invalid. 
On June 12, 1975, one day prior to expi-
ration of the six-month redemption period, 
defendant served a notice of redemption on 
Michael Park, attorney for the Griffiths, 
together with a check for $10,706, the cor-
rect amount needed to redeem the property. 
In response to a telephone call, the Grif-
The claimed deficiencies referred to in 
the letter are based upon Rule 69(f)(2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Redemption—How Made. At the time 
of redemption the person seeking the 
same may make payment of the amount 
required to the person from whom the 
property is being redeemed, or for him 
to the officer who made the sale, or his 
successor in office. At the same time 
the redemptioner must produce to the of-
ficer or person from whom he seeks to 
redeem, and serve with his notice to the 
officer: {{) a certified copy of the 
docket of judgment under which he 
claims the right to redeem, or, if he re-
deems upon a mortgage or other lien, a 
memorandum of the record thereof certi-
fied by the recorder; (2) an assignment, 
properly acknowledged or proved, where 
the same is necessary to establish his 
claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his 
agent showing the amount then actually 
due on the lien. 
[1-3] In analyzing the Griffiths' con-
tention that the provisions of the just quot-
ed rule have not been complied with, there 
5 0 8 Utah 551 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
are certain principles relating to mortgages 
and their foreclosure to be considered. 
The main purpose of a mortgage is to in-
sure the payment of the debt for which is 
stands as security; and foreclosure is al-
lowed when necessary to carry out that 
objective.1 But foreclosure is in the na-
ture of a forfeiture, which the law does 
not favor.2 The proceeding is one in 
equity3 in which principles of equity should 
be applied consistent with the above stated 
purpose; and neither the mortgage nor the 
foreclosure should be used as an instru-
ment of oppression. Accordingly, the law 
provides for the six-month redemption pe-
riod to give the debtor an opportunity to 
pay his debt and salvage his property.4 
[4,51 Consistent with the foregoing, 
rules and statutes dealing with redemption 
are regarded as remedial in character and 
should be given liberal construction and 
application to permit a property owner who 
can pay his debts to do so, and thus make 
his creditor whole, and save his property. 
Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good 
faith, has substantially complied with the 
procedural requirements of the rule in such 
a manner that the lender mortgagee is not 
injured or adversely affected, and is get-
ting what he is entitled to. the law will not 
aid in depriving the mortgagor of his prop-
erty for mere failing short of exact com-
pliance with technicalities.5 
[6] Applying the principles just set 
forth to the facts here: it will be seen that 
none of the matters relied upon by the 
Griffiths as stated in the letter of June 20 
could have had any adverse effect upon 
them. It is plainly apparent that they were 
excuses to justify a preconceived desire to 
refuse to accept the tender and release the 
mortgage. They did not then, and do not 
now, question that the debtor redemption-
First yat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Ray-
mond, SO Utah 151. 57 P.2d 1401. 1405. 
2. See Jensen, v. yuisen, 26 Utah 2d 06. 4S5 
P.2d 673 (1071) ; Jacobson v. Sican. 3 Utah 
2d 50, 27S P.2d 294. 
3. First yat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Hay 
mond, SO Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401. 1405. 
er's rights had, in fact, been properly as-
signed to the defendant; nor that the de-
fendant made the tender of the correct 
amount due for redemption one day before 
the redemption period expired. When so 
advised they did not then indicate any 
ground whatsoever for rejecting the ten-
der. If they had done so, defendants 
would have had 24 hours to remedy any 
technical deficiency. Under such circum-
stances, the law is that if one fails to state 
his objections to a tender, he is deemed to 
have waived them.8 
In view of the undisputed facts as recit-
ed herein it is our opinion that the Grif-
fiths were not justified in refusing to ac-
cept the tendered payment for redemption; 
and that upon receipt of that sum they are 
obliged to release the mortgage. It is so 
ordered. Costs to defendants (appellants). 
HEXRIOD, C. J., and T U C K E T 7 , EL-
LETT and MAUGHAX. ]]., concur. 
E. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment . 
{&) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may. at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
lb) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c> Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and tha t the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated, on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hear ing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts tha t appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
{e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as wrould be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the mat te r s stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
1
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shall s ta te tha t all right, title and interest which the debtor had in and to such 
property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right, 
title and interest since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser. 
(7^ Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to the 
purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: iA< a particular description of the 
real property sold: (B) the price paid by the purchaser for each lot or parcel if 
sold separately: <C) the whole price paid: (D) a statement to the effect that all 
right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the property is 
conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale is subject to 
redemption that fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such certificate shall be 
filed for record by the officer in the office of the recorder of the county. The real 
property sold shall be subject to redemption, except where the estate sold is 
less than a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which event said sale 
is absolute. 
(j) Redemption of real property from, sale. 
' 1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to redemption, or any part 
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their successors 
in interest: (A) the judgment debtor: (B) a creditor having a lien by judgment, 
mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on some share or part thereof, 
subsequent to tha t on which the property was sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. The person seeking redemption may make 
payment of the amount required to the person from whom the property is being 
redeemed, or for such person to the officer who made the sale, or such officer's 
successor in office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the 
officer or person from whom the redemptioner seeks to redeem, and serve with 
the notice to the officer: < A) a certified copy of the judgment under which the 
redemptioner claims the right to redeem, or, if the redemptioner redeems upon 
a mortgage or other lien, a copy eertiried by the recorder; (B> an assignment, 
properly acknowledged or proved where the same is necessary to establish the 
claim; < 0 an affidavit by the redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the 
amount then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other lien. 
<3^  Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be redeemed 
within six months after the sale by paying the amount of the purchase with a 
surcharge of 6 percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any 
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for tire insurance and necessary 
maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property.which 
the purchaser may have paid thereon after the purchase, with interest at the 
lawful rate on such other amounts, and. if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other than the 
judgment under which said purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, 
with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded for 
redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption may pay 
the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court 
out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the 
same time tile with the court and serve upon the purchaser a petition setting 
forth the item or items demanded to which the redemptioner objects, together 
with the grounds of objection: and thereupon the court shall enter an order 
fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of the order fixing time for 
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than five days before the day 
of hearing. Upon the hearing of the petition the court shall enter an order 
determining the amount required for redemption, [n the event an additional 
amount to tha t theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking 
redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount within 7 days. The 
purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper certiticate of redemp-
tion upon being paid the amount required by the court for redemption. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any 
other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days after the last 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
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MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BY THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AND 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
Civil No.: 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment 
submitted by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant. Third Party Plaintiff 
submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23, 1999. Third Party 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party 
Plaintiff, and a Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant submitted a Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2000. Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party Defendant, and a 
Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant's Memorandum also was 
submitted in opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's file was not available to the Court as this case is on appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court requested, and received, copies of these pleadings. The Court has 
reviewed these pleadings, and the case law cited by the parties. The Court has entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows: 
1. Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied and 
dismissed. 
2. The Assignment filed for record in the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 
425 page 821 is hereby declared, and ordered, void, and of no effect. 
3. The Warranty Deed filed for record in the Carbon County Recorder's Office at 
Book 425 Page 822 is hereby declared void, and ordered, void, and of no effect. 
4. Respondent is hereby restored ownership of the real property located at 48 East 
100 North, Price, Utah, more particularly described as follows, to wit: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running Eat 
50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence 
North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and 
across the following described tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running 
thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence West 10 
feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
5. Respondent is hereby restored to possession of the real property located at 48 
East 100 North, Price, Utah. 
6. Respondent is hereby restrained, and enjoined, and shall not grant, bargain, sell, 
convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign 
any document to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, 
transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, Utah, or any interest in said property, or to alter, amend, or change the 
status of the title thereto, or to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, 
encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign any document to grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed 
any property interest, including, but not limited to the right of redemption allowed by Rule 
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to take any action which would allow any other 
person, firm, corporation, partnership, or entity, to make any claim on, for, against, or to 
the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Carbon County, Utah. 
7. The real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah remains subject to 
the judicial lien implemented^ previous orders of the Court. 
DATED this JZ^J^I of t ^ ^ ^ 2 - ^ , 2000. 
District Court Judge 
myfiles\brockbankPennyVord.mot.sum.jud\5-12-00 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
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JAMES L BROCKBANK, 
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PENNY BROCKBANK, 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BY THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFF AND THIRD PARTY 
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Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
Third Party Defendant. 
THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to cross motions for summary judgment 
submitted by Third Party Plaintiff and Third Party Defendant. Third Party Plaintiff 
submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23, 1999. Third Party 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party 
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Plaintiff, and a Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant submitted a Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated January 21, 2000. Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was supported by an Affidavit of the Third Party Defendant, and a 
Memorandum in support thereof. Third Party Defendant's Memorandum also was 
submitted in opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court's file was not available to the Court as this case is on appeal to the Utah Court Of 
Appeals. The Court requested, and received, copies of these pleadings. The Court has 
reviewed these pleadings, and the case law cited by the parties. The Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Supplemental Decree was entered awarding, inter alia, alimony to Third Party 
Plaintiff, real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter referred to as 
48 East), to Respondent, and establishing Third Party Plaintiff a lien in favor of Third Party 
Plaintiff against all real property awarded to Respondent. 
2. The real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah, is more particularly 
described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running Eat 
50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence West 50 feet; thence 
North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way o\jer and 
across the following described tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 feet East of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running 
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thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence West 10 
feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. Third Party Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Carbon County Recorder 
concerning 48 East on October 28, 1997. 
4. Respondent was restrained and enjoined from conveying any interest in real 
property. This restraint was imposed by an Order dated September 22, 1998, labeled, 
"Order on Order to Show Cause Heard September 1, 1998." 
5. 48 East was sold at a sheriffs sale to Third Party Plaintiff. 
6. Respondent executed an Assignment (Exhibit A attached to Third Party Plaintiffs 
Memorandum) to Third Party Defendant, assigning his right of redemption, pursuant to 
Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning the sheriffs sale of 48 East . This 
Assignment was filed in the records of the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 425 
Page 821 (Entry #71125). 
7. Respondent executed a Warranty Deed (Exhibit B attached to Third Party 
Plaintiffs Memorandum) to Third Party Defendant, deeding his interest in 48 East. This 
Warranty Deed was filed in the records of the Carbon County Recorder's Office at Book 
425 Page 822 (Entry #71126). 
8. Respondent's transfer of 48 East by both the Assignment and the Warranty Deed 
were in contravention of the restraining order implemented in the Order dated September 
22, 1998 - that is, Respondent's execution of the Assignment and Warranty Deed were 
in contempt of the Court's restraining order implemented in the order dated September 22, 
1998. 
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9. Third Party Defendant redeemed 48 East. 
10. The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000. 
11. Third Party Plaintiff obtained a joinder to the divorce action of Third Party 
Defendant by filing a Third Party Complaint, and Motion for Joinder. 
12. Third Party Plaintiff alleged a cause of action under the Utah Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (Utah Code Annotated Section 25-6-1 et seq.). 
13. After the redemption, one payment of the mortgage on 48 East was made from 
Respondent's account. 
14. At the time of the execution of the Assignment and Warranty Deed, Respondent 
and Third Party Defendant had been dating. Third Party Defendant characterized her 
relationship with Respondent as "boyfriend and girlfriend." 
15. Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment. 
16. Third Party Defendant paid $50 for the Warranty Deed. 
17. 48 East was an "asset" within the definition of that term under the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
18. Third Party Plaintiff has a claim against Respondent within the definition the 
term "claim" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
19. Third Party Plaintiff was a creditor of Respondent's within the definition of the 
term "creditor" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
20. Respondent owed a debt to Third Party Plaintiff within the definition of the term 
"debt" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
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21. Respondent was a debtor within the definition of the term "debtor" under the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
22. 48 East was property within the definition of the term "property" under the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
23. The Assignment and Warranty Deed was a transfer within the definition of the 
term "transfer" under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
24. No value was given by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the 
Assignment. 
25. No value was given by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Warranty 
Deed. 
26. There was no bargained for exchange concerning the transfer of Respondent's 
interest in 48 East by the Assignment. 
27. There was no bargained for exchange concerning the transfer of Respondent's 
interest in 48 East by the Warrnty Deed. 
28. Respondent and Third Party Defendant were not parties dealing at arms length. 
29. The amount paid by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Assignment 
did not constitute fair market value. 
30. The amount paid by Third Party Defendant to Respondent for the Warranty 
Deed did not constitute fair market value. 
31. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant did not 
involve a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
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32. The transfer of 48 East by Respondent to Third Party Defendant was intended 
to place the asset - 48 East - beyond the reach of Third Party Plaintiff. 
33. Third Party Plaintiff has established the existence of fraudulent intent on behalf 
of Respondent and Third Party Defendant in the transaction between Respondent and 
Third Party Defendant. 
34. Badges of fraud are present in this case. Those facts evidencing badges of 
fraud are: 
a. The nature of the relationship between Respondent and Third Party 
Defendant; 
b. The insignificant monetary amount paid by Third Party Defendant to 
Respondent for the Assignment and Warranty Deed; 
c. Payment of the mortgage from Respondent's account subsequent to the 
Assignment, Warranty Deed, and redemption; 
d. Timing of the Assignment and Warranty Deed in relation to the posture 
of the divorce case; 
e. Respondent's testimony concerning the reason for the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed;1 
f. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant seemed 
Respondent testified that the reason he transferred the property to Third Party 
Defendant was because he did not want the property "to be trashed like the apartments were 
before I got them back". If Respondent was, in truth, and in fact, transferring away his interest 
in the property, he would have no reason to be concerned about the continuing condition of 
the property as his interest was terminated. This testimony indicates Respondent's belief that 
he would someday, in the future, regain, and/or remain, in possession of the property. 
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to be concluded in a hurried manner; 
g. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant seemed 
to depart from the usual method of business where arms length parties negotiate a 
transaction for fair market value; 
h. The fact that Third Party Defendant has not made a claim against 
Respondent concerning the funds utilized to exercise the Right of Redemption transferred 
by the Assignment in light of the Third Party Complaint against her. 
35. These undisputed facts throw suspicion on the transaction between 
Respondent and Third Party Defendant 
36. Neither Respondent nor Third Party Defendant submitted a reasonable 
explanation concerning the facts which indicate badges of fraud. 
37. Third Party Plaintiff did not waive her right to challenge Respondent's transfer 
of 48 East to Third Party Defendant by the Assignment and Warranty Deed. 
38. Third Party Defendant has a cause of action against Respondent concerning 
the funds delivered by Third Party Defendant to Third Party Plaintiff in exercising the Right 
of Redemption transferred by the Assignment. 
39. The fact that Third Party Defendant has failed to pursue that cause of action 
strengthens this Court's belief that collusion exists between Respondent and Third Party 
Defendant concerning the transfer of 48 East, and that the transaction between 
Respondent and Third Party Defendant (both the Assignment and Warranty Deed) is 
fraudulent. 
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40. All of these facts are undisputed. 
41. The undisputed facts establish that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
42. Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to an order declaring the transfer of 48 East from 
Respondent to Third Party Defendant pursuant to the Assignment and Warranty Deed are 
void. 
43. As the Assignment and Warranty Deed are void, title and possession of 48 East 
is restored to Respondent. 
44. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter 
hereof. 
Having made the above Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. 
2. The undisputed facts establish that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
3. Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
4. Third Party Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and 
dismissed. 
5. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant, in the form of 
the Assignment and Warranty Deed, is fraudulent. 
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6. The transaction between Respondent and Third Party Defendant, in the form of 
the Assignment and Warranty Deedt is void. 
7. The Assignment and Warranty Deed purporting to transfer Respondent's Right 
of Redemption and title to 48 East are both void. 
8. Respondent is entitled to an order: 
a. Declaring void the Assignment and Warranty Deed; 
b. Restoring Respondent to possession of 48 East; 
c. Declaring Respondent to be the owner of record of 48 East; 
d. Continuing, and emphasizing, that Respondent continues to be subject 
to a restraining order, restraining, and enjoining, Respondent that he not grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or 
sign any document to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, 
transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, Utah, or any interest in said property, or to alter, amend, or change the 
status of the title thereto, or to grant, bargain, sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, 
encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, deed, or sign any document to grant, bargain, 
sell, convey, hypothecate, mortgage, encumber, lien, transfer, waste, dispose of, or deed 
any property interest, including, but not limited to the right of redemption allowed by Rule 
69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to take any action which would allow any other 
person, firm, corporation, partnership, or entity, to make any claim on, for, against, or to 
the property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Carbon County, Utah; 
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e. Declaring that the property located at 48 East remains subject to the 
judicial lien in favor of Third Party Plaintiff implemented by previous orders of this Court. 
DATED this ^ f ^ ^ a y of ^^>^ZJ2^ . 2000. 
'BRUCE K. HALLIDAY 
District Court Judge 
myfiies\Brockbank\ffc.mot.surn ]udg\5-12-000 
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I. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S OBJECITON TO THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
TO THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT'S 
. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 954700226DA 
Judge. Bruce K. Halliday 
COMES NOW the Third Party Plaintiff (Penny), and submits the following Objection 
to Third Party Defendant's (Rachele), Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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BACKGROUND 
Penny filed a third party action against Rachele claiming transfers of property by 
Respondent to Rachele were fraudulent, and requesting that the alleged fraudulent 
transfers be voided. 
Penny filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an order determining the 
transfers to be void thus restoring title of the property to Respondent. Rachele has filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a determination that Penny has waived any 
defect, and the transfers are valid, and dismissing Penny's action. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Objection is submitted in response to Rachele's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. In this Objection Penny argues: 
1. That her Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, or; 
2. That Rachele's Motion for Summary Judgment snould be denied, or, in the 
alternative; 
3. That Penny should be ordered to pay to Rachele the amount paid by Rachele 
for the redemption and directing that Penny is thereafter the owner of property. 
page z or a 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO ISSUES OF FACT 
To prevail on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving party must establish that 
there are no material issues of fact. Penny notes that Rachele has not contested any of 
the fact issues outlined by Penny in her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Therefore, Penny submits that the uncontested facts outlined by 
Penny in her Memorandum are acknowledged, and accepted, by Rachele. Penny does 
not dispute any of the material facts alleged by Rachele.1 
POINT II 
PENNY ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
Penny will not, at this time, repeat the argument presented in her Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Penny notes that the transaction between 
Respondent and Rachele carry "badges of fraud" and/or are in contravention of the Utah 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
POINT III 
RACHELE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
Rachele has cited United States vs. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah, 1976), and 
Bennion vs. Amoss} 530 P. 2d 810 (Utah, 1975) in support of her position. Penny argues 
!The only facts alleged by Rachele in her Memorandum under "Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" with which Penny takes issue, is paragraph 4 on page 2, concerning an 
alleged informal agreement to not force a sale of the 48 East property. See paragraph 6 of 
Penny's Affidavit, attached hereto. 
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that both cases are not applicable as they both concern foreclosure actions regarding 
mortgages Neither case involves fact scenarios comparable to be case before the Court 
There is reference in United States to Rule 69(f) (2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
In United States, defendants served a notice of redemption, and redemption check, one 
day prior to the expiration of the six-month redemption period The redemption check was 
refused by letter some eight days later reciting, as reasons for the rejecjon, certain 
technical deficiencies The Court noted, "It is plainly apparent that they were excuses to 
justify a preconceived desire to refuse to accept the tender and release the mortgage" 
Tne Court also noted 
' Consistent with the foregoing rules and statutes dealing with 
redemption are regarded as remedial in character and should 
be given liberal construction and application to permit a 
property owner who can pay his debts to do so and thus make 
his creditor whole and save his property Tnerefore if a 
debtor acting in good faith has substantially complied with the 
procedural requirements of the rule in such a manner that the 
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely affected and is 
getting what he is entitled, to, the law will not aid in depriving 
the mortgagor of his property for mere falling short of exact 
compliance with technicalities" 
The Court held that under the undisputed facts the refusal of the tender for 
redemption was not justified, stating, "Under such circumstances, the law is that if one fails 
to state his objections to a tender, he is deemed to have waived them " In other words, 
because the tender was rejected based on technicalities, there was a waiver of those 
objections due to the acceptance of the tender 
Penny submits that there are no facts in this case which would indicate a waiver of 
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any "technicalities." 
The problem with accepting the Respondent's assignment to Rachele is that such 
assignment allows property, subject to the Court's jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the 
Decree, to be removed from the Court's jurisdiction, and away from Penny's ability to 
enforce the lien awarded in the Decree. This Court has previously indicated that the 
purpose for the lien in the Decree, was to give Penny the ability to enforce the award of 
alimony. Such shenanigans should not be tolerated by this Court either as a matter of law, 
or as a matter of equity. 
POINT IV 
EQUITIES 
Rachele argues that it is not equitable for Penny to profit by retaining the amount 
paid by Rachele when she redeemed the property. 
Penny's response is that equity leans more heavily in her favor. In this case, 
Rachele and Respondent conspired to remove the subject property from Penny's lien. 
Certainly Penny had no involvement in the transaction between Respondent and Rachele. 
If Rachele was not completely aware of the entire situation, her claim is against 
Respondent. Rachele was in a position to know, or at least determine, all of the facts. 
Certainly she was aware of Respondent's divorce, and the terms of the Decree -
particularly with reference to the lien. Rachele testified that there was discussion involving 
Rachele, Respondent, and Respondent's counsel, when the assignment and Warranty 
Deed were executed. 
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Penny submits that if the equities were weighed, the totality of the circumstances 
indicate that the argument, certainly, should go in her favor. It is reasunaule to conclude, 
from the undisputed facts before the Court, that Respondent and Rachele conspired to 
remove the subject property from the lien imposed by the Court in the Decree. Penny does 
not believe that either law, or equity, dictate that she should end up on the short and of 
that stick. 
Rachele has not asserted a claim against Respondent. Obviously, Rachele has a 
claim against Respondent. Penny should not be hurt by Rachele's refusal to pursue an 
obvious, and logical, claim. 
POINT V 
Assuming the Court finds merit in Rachele's equitable argument because she is out 
$16,653, Penny is willing to pay that amount to her on condition that the Court then 
determine Respondent's redemption time has expired, and that Penny now is the owner 
of the subject property. 
Penny's position is, and consistently has been, that the Assignment and Warranty 
Deed are ineffectual as they are the product of fraud. The redemption should be credited 
to Respondent, as if it were he who performed the redemption. By so holding, Respondent 
is receiving credit, as he should, for the redemption, and the title to the property is restored 
to him. 
In the alternative, as indicated herein, and in Penny's Affidavit, she is willing to pay 
$16,653, which Rachele paid for the redemption, and proceed as if the redemption had not 
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occurred Under that scenario, Penny should be held to be the owner of the property 
In short, Penny argues that neither Respondent nor Third Party Plaintiff should 
benefit from their fraud Either their action, i e the Assignment and Warranty Deed, is 
fraudulent as to Penny, and the Court should restore the status quo - that is, allow credit 
for Respondent concerning the redemption price, and restore title to him - or, the Court 
should compensate Rachele by allowing Penny to pay to Rachele the amount of money 
she is out (i e $16,653), hold that the redemption did not occur, and determine that Penny 
is the owner of the property 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Penny urges the following 
1 That her Motion for Summary Judgment be granted,2 or, 
2 That Rachele's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted by directing Penny to 
pay $16 653 to Rachele, determining that Respondent had failed to exercise his right of 
redemption, and directing that Penny is the owner of the subject property 
DATED this 7 day of ,2000 
JOHN E SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Petitioner 
:The affect of this order would be to restore the status quo prior to the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed, such that the redemption was exercised by Respondent, title to the subject 
property is restored to him, and he got credit for the amount paid through the redemption 
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J. AFFIDAVIT OF CHERYL RACHELE IN SUPPORT OF THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; and IN OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
jAN25i:o l 
-J 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) 
rVTJE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for James L. Brockbank and Cheryl Rachele 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah, 8^603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
J.AMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHERYL RACHELE IN 
SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and IN 
OPPOSITION TO THIRD P.ARTY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION1 FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halhday 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third party plaintiff, 
v. 
CHERYL RACHELE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
I3SQ 
3> - c ^  ^ *~* -^ v ~ ~^:: * :^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss, 
County of Carbon ) 
CHERYL RACHELE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of 21 and all matters attested hereto are based upon first hand 
knowledge. 
2. 1 did not receive any funds which I generated to redeem the 48 East Property from 
James Brockbank. 
3. L enjoy ftill possession of the 48 East Property. 
4. My redemption of the 48 East Property was not intended to defraud Penny 
Brockbank. I intended to by the property for SI5,000. 
5. Penny Brockbank has never tried to return the redemption check to me, has not 
objected to the payment, has not placed any restriction on reciept of the payment, nor any portion 
of the redemption price. 
DATED this ^ d a y of January, 2000. Ciii^L/C fowl*— 
CHERYL RACHELE 
- I 1 
Subscribed and sworn before me this /- t day of January, 2000. / 
rr'i/iJi 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
H:\COMMO>AMAFtKvBRENT^aROCKBAN\ArtU»v1i of Owr?l fUchele.doc CLAY G. H0LBR00K 
$ \ WWfly'UBUC-SWEaf.UMH 
|>V 2 4 3 E MAIN 
A , „ v « PRICE, UT 84501 
t>r.<;" ' C0MM. EXP. 3-23-2000 
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K. COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S CORSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
and IN OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
&V25..J 
BRENT D. YOUNG (3584) . 
IVTE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for James L. Brockbank and Cheryl Rachele 
226 W. 2230 North 
P.O. Box 657 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY* BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
COMBINED MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; and IN 
OPPOSITION TO THIRD P.ARTY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third party plaintiff, 
v. 
Civil No. 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
CHERYL RACHELE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Comes now the Third Party Defendant Cheryl Rachele, by and through counsel of record, 
and herby submits this Combined Memorandum in Support of Third Party Defendant's Cross- • 
Motion for Summary Judgment; and in Opposition to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. James Brockbank and Penny Brockbank are parties to a divorce action, which is 
the primary case herein. (Record at 1.) 
2. A Supplemental Decree was entered on or about February 18, 1998. (Record at 
289.) 
3. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Supplemental Decree, James was awarded certain 
property, including the real property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter 
sometimes "the 48 East Property.") (Record at 292.) 
4. James and Penny had an informal agreement that Penny would not force a sale of 
the 48 East Property. (Record at 944, ffi| 2-4.) 
5. Based on the Supplemental Decree wherein a judgment wras entered in the 
approximate amount of S42,832.88,] Penny caused a Writ of Execution to be levied on James' 48 
East Property. (Record at 944.) 
6. The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000. (Penny's 
Uncontested Material Facts j^ 7). 
1
 Paragraph 10A of the Decree provided a judgment of $3,371.88. Paragraph 10B 
of the Decree provided a judgment of $39,461.00, which total is $42,832.88. 
7. At the sheriffs sale of the 48 East Property on December 23, 1998, Penny credit 
bid the amount of Fifteen Thousand (SI 5,000) and took possession of the property. (Record at 
491.) 
8. The mortgage remaining on the 48 East Property at the time of the sheriffs sale 
was approximately $2,000 to S3,000. (Record at 944, ] 4.) 
9. James did not have funds available to redeem the 48 East Property. (Record at 
945,ffl|7,9.) 
10. Because James understood that Penny owned the 48 East Property subsequent to 
the sheriffs sale, James did not believe that his assignment of the right of redemption would 
violate the court's order restraining him from conveying or pledging his real property. (Record 
at 946, ^10; 1116, pp. 152-154.) 
11. James thereafter on January 5, 1999, assigned the right of redemption to Cheryl 
Rachele for S100. (Record at 485; Penny's Uncontested Material Facts 1 9a.) 
12. Cheryl Rachele redeemed the property from Penny for SI6,653, which included 
the bid price of S15,000, plus interest, plus attorney's fees. (Record at 486-487.) 
13. Thus, Cheryl paid (combining price paid to buy right of redemption and to 
redeem) 516,753 for the 48 East property. (James Statement of Undisputed Facts ffi[ 11-12.) 
14. Penny accepted the amount of 516,653 from Cheryl as the redemption price of the 
48 East Property. (Record at 486-487, 860-861.) 
15. The amount of 515,000 was credited to Penny's judgment against James. (Record 
at 860-861.) (See Stipulation and Order to Release Funds and Satisfy Judgment against James L. 
Brockbank, page 2.) 
16. Cheryl has possession and control of the 48 East Property. (Record at 1116, page 
123,1ns. 17-18.) 
17. Cheryl owns the 48 East Property. 
18. On January 6, 1999. Penny added Cheryl as a defendant claiming fraud in James' 
assignment to Cheryl. (Record at 480.) 
19. At no time has Penny returned or attempted to return the amount of the 
redemption price to Cheryl. (Affidavit of Cheryl Rachele.) 
ARGUMENT 
L SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
CHERYL RACHELE IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
DEMONSTRATE THAT PENNY BROCKBANK WAIVED ANY OBJECTION 
TO THE ASSIGNMENT AND REDEMPTION BY ACCEPTING THE 
REDEMPTION PRICE PAID. 
Penny's acceptance of the redemption price, attorney's fees, and statutory interest 
establish her waiver of the right to challenge James' assignment of his right of redemption. 
When Penny initiated a sheriffs sale, credit bid at the sale what she asserted to be a fair value, 
and then accepted Cheryl's money to redeem the property, Penny waived the right to challenge 
James' assignment to Cheryl. Moreover, by accepting the redemption price without reservation, 
Penny confirmed that Cheryl would have ownership of the property. Penny's actions lead only 
to one reasonable legal conclusion—that Penny waived her right to challenge James' assignment 
of his right of redemption to Cheryl. 
The fact that Penny has waived her objections to Cheryl's redemption of the 48 East 
Property is illustrated by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in U.S. v. Loosely, 551 P.2d 506 
(Utah 1976). In Looselv, the United States Small Business Administration brought a foreclosure 
action on a service station after the lessors, the Looselys, failed to repay a Small Business 
Administration loan. Id. at 507. The Griffiths purchased the service station property at the 
sheriffs sale. The Looselys assigned their right of redemption to the Hammons, who in turn 
assigned the right to Basic Investment, Inc. Basic Investment exercised the right of redemption 
one-day before the six-month redemption period expired by serving the notice of redemption and 
check for the redemption amount on the Griffiths' attorney. The Griffiths accepted the 
redemption price. Eight days later, the Griffiths returned the redemption check on the grounds 
that the attempt to redeem was invalid. Id. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the redemption was valid because the redemption 
statute had been substantially complied with. The Court further held that the Griffiths had 
waived their objections to the redemption because they did not object to the redemption at the 
time it was made. Id. at 508. The Court stated: "the law is that if one fails to state his objections 
to a tender, he is deemed to have waived them."2 IcL 
2 This is a significant point in the appeal of this matter. Counsel has repeatedly urged upon 
the Court the legal principle that once the period of redemption expires, the individual who 
purchases at the sheriffs sale or the individual who subsequently redeems acquires all right, title, 
and interest to the property. The Loosely case establishes this principle without question. 
In the present case, Penny accepted the redemption price from Cheryl. Penny did not 
object to Cheryl's tender at the time Penny accepted the SI6,653 from Cheryl. Penny failed to 
state any objection to the redemption on any grounds that the redemption or the assignment was 
invalid. Indeed, Penny accepted the benefit of Cheryl's redemption—Penny's judgment against 
James was credited the amount of the redemption price. (Record at 860-861.) Penny has never 
returned or attempted to return the redemption price to Cheryl. These facts lead to only one 
reasonable legal conclusion: Penny waived any objection to the assignment and subsequent 
redemption. The case law recognizes this waiver. Consequently, this Court should not allow 
Penny to take the benefit of the redemption, and then claim that the redemption was fraudulent. 
See also Bennion v. Amoss, 530 P.2d S10, 812 (Utah 1975) ('Vhere a redemption of the 
property has taken place, the person redeeming is estopped from asserting any invalidity to the 
sale"). 
Moreover, when Penny accepted the redemption price from Cheryl, Penny also ratified 
James' assignment of the right of redemption to Cheryl.3 In a broad sense, ratification is 
defmed as "the confirmation of a previous act done either by the party himself or by "another." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (1991), page 872; see also, Bullock v. State Dept. of 
Transportation, 966 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (a party's retention of the fruits of 
a transaction serves as an implied ratification of that transaction). It would be unlawful and 
3
 In the Stipulation and Order to Release Funds and Satisfy Judgment against James L. 
Brockbank, Penny's judgment against James was credited the amount of the redemption price. 
(Record at 860-861.) 
certainly inequitable for Penny to enjoy the benefits of the assignment by accepting the 
redemption price, and then allow Penny to claim the assignment and the redemption were a fraud 
committed upon her. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
CHERYL RACHELE IS PROPER BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
EVIDENCE THAT THE ASSIGNMENT WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER. 
Penny does not present any evidence that James or Cheryl intended to defraud her by 
assigning the right of redemption or that the assignment and redemption were not for reasonably 
equivalent value. The Court must find fraudulent intent in order to invalidate the assignment. 
Intent may be inferred from certain circumstances, commonly referred to as "badges of fraud." 
However, those circumstances are not present in this case. Because there are no indicia of 
fraudulent intent, summary judgment should be entered in favor of Cheryl. 
A. Cheryl's Purchase of the Assignment and Her Redemption of the Property 
Were for Fair Market Value. 
Cheryl purchased the right to redeem the 48 East Property for SI00. This purchase did 
not give her possession of the property. To acquire full title and possession of the property, 
Cheryl was required to obtain and to pay to Penny the SI5,000 credit bid made at the execution 
sale, plus costs associated with the sale, plus interest, totaling 516,653. The right of redemption 
purchased by Cheryl for SI00 amounted to an option to buy. This option merely allowed Cheryl 
to purchase the property at the amount Penny determined to be the fair market value—the 
515,000 which Penny bid for the 48 East Property. 
At the sheriffs sale, Penny credit bid SI 5,000, which was the amount she deemed to be 
the fair market value of the property. (Record at 491.) Penny should not now be heard to 
complain that Cheryl's redemption of the property for 515,000, plus fees and statutory costs, was 
a fraud. Penny attempted and succeeded in obtaining the same piece of property for SI 5,000. 
Penny has previously testified that, in her view, there was nothing unfair about the 515,000 price 
she paid for the 48 East Property. (Record 4:03:24.) Penny appears to present the argument 
that, as a judgment creditor, she had the right to take advantage of the judgment debtor by taking 
his property for one third of its fair market value. But inconsistently, after having pocketed the 
SI 5,000 redemption price, Penny argues that the redemption of the property for SI 5,000 is unfair 
and fraudulent as to her. If 515,000 is a fair price for the 4S East Property—as Penny 
maintains—then the redemption price of SI5,000 is also a fair price. Penny's contention—that 
the amount Cheryl paid to redeem the property is so unfair as to create a fraud—is disingenuous, 
especially because Penny set the price of the redemption by bidding SI 5,000 at the sale and 
accepted the 515,000 for redemption. 
The case Tech-Fluid Services Inc. v. Galivan Operating Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), is helpful in recognizing that the amount bid at a sheriffs sale is a fair market value 
of the property to be redeemed. In Tech-Fluid, Tech-Fluid commenced an action to foreclose its 
mechanic's lien in the amount of S69,708 on an oil and gas well owned by Paiute Oil and Mining 
Corporation. Id. 1330. At the sheriffs sale, Tech-Fluid purchased the property for 54,000. 
After the sale, Paiute assigned its right of redemption to Wind River Resources Corporation. 
Wind River redeemed the property now owned by Tech-Fluid for 54,000 plus cosl and statutory 
fees. Tech-Fluid contended that Wind River should have paid the entire amount of Tech-Fluid's 
lien—the amount of S69,703, rather than the S4,000 redemption price—because the property was 
valued at more than the redemption price and there remained a debt by the original owner. The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument: 
Tech-Fluid is bound by its choices, including the decision to bid only S4,000 on the well. 
As the only bidder at the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value of the well for redemption 
purposes and placed itself in the predicament it now finds itself. [Citations omitted.] 
According to Rule 69(f)(3), Wind River was only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid [sic] 
paid plus the specified interest. 
Id, at 1335. 
Penny set the credit bid at one-third the appraised value of the property. She did this so 
that only SI5,000 would be applied to James' debt to her. Thus, Penny hoped to obtain a 
530,000 windfall when the redemption period expired. Now Penny argues that Cheryl's 
purchase of the right to redeem and ultimate redemption of the property for 515,000 is 
fraudulent. The amount Cheryl paid for the assignment and for the redemption price was the 
fair value of the property, which Penny established by credit bidding the value of S15,000 at the 
sheriffs sale. Pursuant to Tech-Fluid, the only reasonable legal conclusion is that the 515,000 
paid to redeem the 48 East Property is adequate compensation for property for which Penny 
credit bid 515,000. 
B. Cheryl's Purchase of the Assignment and Subsequent Redemption of the 48 
East Property Were Not Done With "Actual Intent" to Hinder, Delay or 
Defraud Penny. 
Utah Code Section 25-6-5(2) outlines the factors which may be relevant to determine 
"actual intent." A review of the facts of this case demonstrates that there is no evidence of actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud Penny. 
1. Cheryl is not an insider. Utah Code Section 25-6-2(7)(a) defines an insider as "a 
relative of the debtor." Cheryl is not related to James. Thus, under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, Cheryl is not an insider. 
2. Cheryl maintains possession of the 48 East Property. Cheryl has full possession 
and control of the property, with the exception of one mortgage payment made by Brockbank 
appraisal. Because Cheryl has possession of the property, because James does not use the 
propeny nor receive any financial gain from the property, there is no "badge of fraud." Penny's 
allegation that James anticipates the return of the property is disputed and is not sufficient to 
support a legal conclusion that the assignment and redemption were fraudulent. 
3. The assignment and redemption were not concealed from Penny, and the 
assignment was not substantially all of James' assets. James' assignment of his right of 
redemption to Cheryl was not concealed from Penny. In fact, as previously explained, Penny 
accepted the redemption price and credited her judgment against James in that amount. 
Additionally, the assignment of James' right of redemption was not an assignment of 
substantially all of his assets. James owned other real property. In fact, Penny's judgment 
against James was paid in full by the sale of his real property located at 38 East 100 North. 
(Record at 860.) 
4. James did not abscond, nor did he become insolvent as a result of the assignment 
of the right of redemption. James did not abscond. Additionally, James did not become 
insolvent by the assignment of the right of redemption. As previously explained, Penny's 
judgment against James was paid in full shortly after the 48 East Property was redeemed. 
5. The assignment did not place James' assets beyond Penny's reach. Penny 
purchased the 48 East Property at the sheriffs sale, subject to the right of redemption. Thus, 
Penny—as a creditor of James'—had the 48 East Property in her hands. By purchasing the 
property at the sheriffs sale, Penny acquired all right, title, interest and claim to the 48 East 
Property, subject to the right of redemption. Significantly, by purchasing the 48 East Property, 
Penny exercised her right of execution and satisfied her lien as against the 48 East Property. 
Penny elected to sell the 48 East Property in satisfaction of her judgment lien as against that 
property. As a matter of law, the exercise of a right of redemption in that circumstance cannot be 
a fraud.4 
4 Cheryl notes that the issue of whether the assignment violated the Court's order 
prohibiting James from conveying or pledging real property is before the Utah Court of Appeals 
at this time. This issue is not material to Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment because 
Penny's waiver and ratification of the assignment are dispositive. However, Cheryl contends 
that this disputed issue of fact and law precludes the granting of Penny's motion for summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts clearly evidence that Penny has waived any objection to the 
assignment of the right of redemption and the subsequent redemption because Penny accepted 
the redemption price. Because Penny made no objections to Cheryl's tender of the redemption 
price (indeed, Penny accepted the money), the law deems that Penny has waived her objections. 
Also, because Penny accepted the redemption price, she ratified James' assignment of the right 
of redemption. To allow Penny to claim the redemption was a fraud, when she accepted the 
benefit therefrom without objection, would be unlawful and inequitable. 
The undisputed facts also indicate that the assignment of the right of redemption was not 
a fraudulent transfer. The assignment and redemption were for reasonably equivalent value, as 
established by Penny, and were not made with intent to hinder or delay Penny. In fact, the 
sheriffs sale and the redemption resulted from Penny exercising her rights as a creditor to satisfy 
her judgment lien as against the 48 East Property. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Third Party Defendant Cheryl Rachele respectfully 
requests this Court to deny Third Party Plaintiff Penny Brockbank's motion for summary 
judgment and to enter summary judgment in favor of Third Party Defendant Cheryl Rachele. 
Dated this 2! day of January 2000. 
feRENT D. Y$UN(7 
Attorney for Third Farty Defendant 
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JOHN E. SCHINDLER#3619 
Attorney for Petitioner 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THIRD 
PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT 
Civil No : 954700226DA 
Judge: Bruce K. Halliday 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE a/k/a 
CHERYL HUNSAKER. 
Third Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Third Party Plaintiff and submits the following Memorandum in 
support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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BACKGROUND 
This matter was initiated by a Third Party Complaint dated January 6, 1999 Said 
Complaint alleges that the transfer of the property described in the Complaint, by 
Respondent to Third Party Defendant, was a fraudulent transaction and should be voided 
INTRODUCTION 
The parties were divorced by Decree in the underlying action A Supplemental 
Decree was entered awarding alimony to Third Party Plaintiff, awarding certain real 
property to Respondent, and awarding a lien to Third Party Plaintiff on the real property 
awarded to Respondent to secure amounts determined to be due by Respondent to Third 
Party Plaintiff, including alimony 
A subsequent order was entered restraining and enjoining Respondent, from 
conveying his interest in real property (See Order dated September 11, 1998) 
Respondent failed to pay the amounts ordered to be paid to Third Party Plaintiff by 
Respondent Third Party Plaintiff obtained a Writ of Execution directing the sale of real 
property located at 48 East 100 North, Price, Utah (hereinafter referred to as "48 East") 
Third Party Plaintiff purchased 48 East at the Sheriffs Sale Respondent executed 
an Assignment (See attached Exhibit A ), and a Warranty Deed (See attached Exhibit B ) 
The Third Party Defendant redeemed the property, pursuant to the Assignment and 
Warranty Deed, and Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Third Party Plaintiff initiated the pending action seeking an order voiding the 
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Assignment and Warranty Deed, thereby restoring title of the property to Respondent. 
Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by Third 
Party Plaintiff. Said Motion is supported by Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit (attached to 
Motion for Summary Judgment), and exhibits submitted as attachments hereto as well as 
exhibits to the Memorandum. By this Motion, Third Party Plaintiff argues that there are no 
issues of material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Third Party Plaintiff submits the following facts, which she asserts are not contested. 
1. A Supplemental Decree was entered: 
A. Awarding alimony to Petitioner; 
B. Awarding real property located at 48 East to Respondent (^ j 5B); 
C. Awarding Petitioner a lien against all real property awarded to 
Respondent to secure the Respondent's alimony obligation (U 10). 
2. Third Party Plaintiff filed a Notice of Interest with the Carbon County Recorder 
concerning the property at 48 East on October 28, 1997. (See Exhibit A, attached to Third 
Party Plaintiffs Affidavit, attached to Third Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.); 
2. Respondent was restrained and enjoined from conveying any interest in real 
property by an Order dated September 22, 1998, labeled "Order on Order to Show Cause 
Heard September 1, 1998" (See paragraph 4).1 
1
 Paragraph 4 states: "Respondent is hereby restrained and enjoined from taking any 
action to convey or pledge any of the real property awarded him by the Supplemental Decree." 
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3 48 East was sold at a Sheriffs Sale to Petitioner/Third Party Plaintiff, 
4 Respondent executed an Assignment (See attached Exhibit A) concerning his 
right of redemption pursuant to Rule 69 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
5 Respondent executed a Warranty Deed (See attached Exhibit B ) 
6 Third Party Defendant redeemed 48 East 
7 The value of 48 East, as of the date of redemption, was at least $45,000 (See 
Third Party Plaintiffs Affidavit, 1J5 ) 
7 Petitioner initiated the pending action against Third Party Defendant; 
8 Third Party Defendant testified at a hearing on March 15, 1999, as follows 2 
A One payment of the mortgage, concerning 48 East, was made from 
Respondent's account after the redemption, 
B That Respondent and Third Party Defendant have a personal relationship 
"as in boyfriend and girlfriend n (See page 118 ) 
C That Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment (See page 
121 ) 
9 Respondent testified at a hearing on March 15, 1999, as follows.3 
A Third Party Defendant paid $100 for the Assignment (See page 146 ), 
B Third Party Defendant paid $50 for the Warranty Deed (See page 146 ); 
C He transferred the property to Third Party Defendant because he did not 
2Attached as Exhibit C is a copy of Third Party Defendant's testimony in total 
"Attached as Exhibit D is a copy of Respondent's testimony in total 
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want the property (48 East)M to be trashed like the apartments were before I got them 
back " (See page 151 ), 
D A payment was made concerning 48 East, to the mortgage holder after 
the Assignment and Warranty Deed This payment was from his account (See page 
159) 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
NO ISSUES OF FACT 
To prevail concerning the pending Motion, Third Party Plaintiff must establish that 
there are no material issues of fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Pappas vs. Richfield City, 962 P 2d 63 (Ct App 
1S98) 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that all of the facts, listed above, have either been 
established by written document, or by testimony of opposing parties - i e , Third Party 
Defendant and Respondent To prevail on a Motion for Summary Judgment, the moving 
party must establish that there are no material issues of fact 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that these facts are uncontroverted, and that she, 
therefore, has satisfied the first hurdle to obtain an order granting her Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
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Point II 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER 
The second hurdle facing the moving party in a Motion for Summary Judgment is 
to establish that they are entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, based on the 
uncontroverted facts Third Party Plaintiff submits that, as a matter of law, based on the 
established, uncontroverted facts she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is found at Utah Code Annotated Title 25 Chapter 
6 Third Party Plaintiff argues that these statutes mandate a ruling in her favor 
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-2 contains several definitions which are helpful in 
making the conclusion that Third Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
Those definitions are as follows 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim, 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim, 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim, 
(S) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of 
a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by 
agreement a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership, 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or 
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset 
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From these statutory definitions the following is clear 
1 48 East is an asset, 
2 Third Party Plaintiff has a claim against Respondent, 
3 Third Party Plaintiff is a creaitor of Respondent, 
4 A debt existed between Third Party Plaintiff and Respondent, 
5 Respondent is a debtor, 
6 48 East was subject to a lien, 
7 48 East is "property", 
8 Respondent transferred the property (48 East) to Third Party Defendant 
Tmrd Party Plaintiff submits the transfer was not for value 
"Value is defined at Utah Code Annotated §25-6-4 (1) as follows (1) "Value is given for 
a transfer or an obligation if in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is 
transferred o^ an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied " In this case, Third Party 
Defendant paid Respondent $100 for the Assignment, and $50 for the Warranty Deed 
With these transfers, Third Party Defendant received real property valued in at least the 
amount of $45,000 Third Party Plaintiff asserts there was not a " bargained for exchange" 
between "arms length" parties, which also indicates value was not given by Third Party 
Defendant 
Third Party Plaintiff argues that the transfer was not for fair market value Fair 
market value is defined as "the amount at which property would change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and 
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both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts " Philip A. vs. Salt Lake City, 
983 P 2d 566 (Utah 1999), In Re Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P 2d 969 (Utah 1996), 
UCA §59-2-102(11) 
Courts of this jurisdiction have voided transfers when the transfer of property was 
designed to place a debtor's assets beyond reach of the debtor's creditors Butler vs. 
Wilkinson, 740 P 2d 1244 (Utah 1987), Dahnken, Inc. vs. Wilmarth, 726 P 2d 420 (Utah 
1986) 
In Dahnken the Court stated 
Wilmarth's third claim, that the evidence did not support the 
trial court's finding that the assignment was maae with actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud Davis' creditors, is also 
without merit Although actual fraudulent intent must be shown 
to hold a conveyance fraudulent pursuant to § 25-1-7, its 
existence may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia 
of fraud or "badges of fraud " Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 
287, 291 351 P 2d 959, 962 (1960) Badges of fraud that 
pertain to this case are a debtor's (1) continuing in possession 
and evidencing the perquisites of prooerty ownership after 
having formally conveyed all his interest in the property, (2) 
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, and (3) 
making a conveyance to a family member without receiving fair 
consideration Id 
"Badges of Fraud" have also been discussed in other cases in Utah The Court of 
Appeals in Territorial Savings and Loan Association vs. Baird, 781 P 2d 452 (Ct. App. 
1989)4 stated 
"[Badges of fraud] are said to be facts which throw suspicion 
on a transaction, and which call for an explanation More 
simply stated, they are signs or marks of fraud They do not of 
4This case is attached as Exhibit E 
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themselves or per se constitute fraud, but they are facts having 
a tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value 
as evidence is relative not absolute. They are not usually 
conclusive proof; they are open to explanation. They may be 
almost conclusive, or they may furnish merely a reasonable 
inference of fraud, according to the weight to which they may 
be entitled from their intrinsic character and the special 
circumstances attending the case. Often a single one of them 
may establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent...." 
The generally recognized badges of fraud are the lack of 
consideration for the conveyance, the transfer of the debtor's 
entire estate, relationship between transferor and the 
transferee, the pendency or threat of litigation, secrecy or 
hurried transaction, insolvency or indebtedness of the 
transferor, departure from the usual method of business, the 
retention by the debtor of possession of the property, and the 
reservation of benefit to the transferor. 
"Badges of Fraud," or other indicators of fraud "have been described as facts which 
"throw suspicion on a transaction and which call for an explanation. . . facts having a 
tendency to show the existence of fraud, although their value as evidence is relative not 
absolute. Selvage vs. J J Johnson & Assoc. 910 P. 2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1996)5, citing 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association vs. Baird, supra. 
In this case, all of the "badges of fraud" are present - and are uncontroverted facts. 
There is a lack of consideration for the conveyance. There is a relationship between the 
transferor and the transferee. There is pending litigation. There is a departure from the 
usual method of business. There is a reservation of benefit to the transferor. There is. 
continued involvement with the transferred property by the transferor in the form of a 
payment, and in the form of anticipated return of the property (See Respondent's testimony 
5This case is attached as Exhibit F 
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at p 151 of Exhibit D wherein he indicates that he did not "want the property to be trashed 
like the apartments were before I got them back ") 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that the uncontroverted facts establish that she is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law in that the transfer of 48 East by Respondent to 
Third Party Defendant constitutes a fraudulent conveyance as contemplated by the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and applicable case law 
CONCLUSION 
Third Party Plaintiff has established that both hurdles required by a moving party 
to prevail in a motion for summary judgment have been surmounted There are no material 
issues of fact Based on the uncontroverted material issues of fact, Third Party Plaintiff 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
Third Party Plaintiff submits that she is entitled to an order voiding the transfer of 
48 East by Respondent to Third Party Defendant thus restoring title of said property to 
Respondent 
DATED this Q^i day of , L .<> „, d < , 1999 
j g t fN E SCHINDLER 
Attorney for Third Party Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ^ / g , day of M-SS+M / W < ^ . 1999, I mailed a 
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true and correct copy of the above THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT by placing same in the 
U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Brent D. Young, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North 
University Ave. ,P. 0. Box 657, Provo, UT 84603.-. 
/ y A 
myfiles\brockbankPenny\Mem.Mot.Sum.Judg.\mo 
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ASSIGNMENT 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK hereby assigns, sets over, and transfers all of his right to 
redemption pursuant to the Sheriffs Sale which was conducted on 23 December, 1998 at the 
Carbon County Courthouse, to CHERYL RACHELE for the sum of FIFTY and no/100 
DOLLARS (S50.00) and other good and valuable consideration. The Assignment of the 
redemption applies to the following described property, located at 48 East 100 North, Price, 
Carbon County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 214 feet East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE 
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 50 feet; thence South 152.5 feet, thence 
West 50 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Subject to, and together with a joint right of way over and across the following described 
tract of land: 
Beginning at a point 209 Te^t East of the Northwest Comer of Lot 3, Block 40 PRICE 
TOWNSITE SURVEY, and running thence East 10 feet; thence South 152.5 feet; thence 
West 10 feet; thence North 152.5 feet to the point of beginning. 
Dated this j£jday of January, 1999. •- * 
^TAMES L. BROCKBANK 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of CARBON ) 
On the S_ day of January, 1999, personally appeared before me JAMES L. 
BROCKBANK, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. _ ^ / _ . , / 
KRISTI L. GREEN 
itwsERS'.MA»ctBowv6_cJ>o^^»f^^G HQTAHT PUBLIC • STAT? tt UTAH 
248 EAST MAIN 
PRICE. UT 8-*501 
C0MM. EXP. 4-14-2001 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
M. THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
......---n; 
JOHN E. SCHINDLER #3619 • ' c\\*J\;^ 
Attorney for Petitioner -- *'"" 
80 West Main, Suite 201 \ ..-- f V n ' V 
Price, Utah 84501 J . .• V. 
Telephone: (435)637-1783 _ _ - - ; . ' J c \ _ J ; 
FAX: (435) 637-5269 ~~-^J^-^^ 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CARBON COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BROCKBANK, 
Respondent. 
PENNY BROCKBANK, 
Third Party-Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
CHERYL RACHELE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT 
CONCERNING THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No.. 954700226DA 
Judge- Bruce K. Halliday 
J 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
-ss. 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
COMES NOW, PENNY BROCKBANK, and being first duly sworn upon her oath, 
deposes and states: 
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1 Affiant is the Third Party Plaintiff. 
2. Affiant's primary position concerning the present pending Motions for Summary 
Judgment submitted by Affiant and Third Party Defendant is that the assignment of 
Respondent's right of redemption is fraudulent as to Third Party Plaintiff, and, therefore, 
of no effect. As the assignment is of no effect, the redemption was as if it were effectuated 
by Respondent, and, therefore, title should be restored to Respondent. 
3. Affiant understands Third Party Defendant is arguing that Affiant has waived any 
right to object to the Assignment. Third Party Defendant argues that she should be made 
whole by receiving the amount paid for the redemption. 
4 Affiant is willing, as an alternate, or secondary, position, to pay to Third Party 
Defendant the amount oaid for the redemption ($16,653), provided Affiant then becomes 
the fee simple owner of the prooerty 
5 Should the Court consider, as an option, ordering Affiant to repay Third Party 
Defendant the amount paid by Third Party Defendant for the redemption, Affiant would not 
oppose such an order provided the order also indicated that the redemption did not occur 
and that Affiant, upon payment, is vested with the title to the subject property 
6 Affiant has reviewed the Third Party Defendant's Memorandum concerning her 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Third Party Defendant recites in paragraph 4, on page 2, 
of her Memorandum that there was an informal agreement that Affiant would not force a 
sale of the 48 East property Affiant denies that there was ever an informal agreement that 
she would not force a sale of the 48 East property. 
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7 Affiant was not aware of the Assignment from Respondent to Third Party 
Defendant until after the tender, and receipt, of the funds to accomplish the redemption 
8 Affiant was not aware of the Warranty Deed from Respondent to Third Party 
Defendant until after the tender, and receipt, of the funds to accomplish the redemption 
DATED this. ^ ^ay- of ^ fa, / / ^ ~ N , 2Q00 
PENNY BRQCKBANK V. i JOWN E SCHINDLER 
Petitionee^ Attorney for Petitioner 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
PENNY BROCKBANK being duly sworn upon oath, deposes ard says that she is 
the Petitioner in the aoove entitled action that she has read the foregoing AFFIDAVIT and 
unders:ards the same is true to her own knowledge except as to matters therein stated on 
information and belief, and as to such matters she believes them to be true 
myfiles\SrockbankPenny\Aff 3rd Party Mot Sum Judgment 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of rJ£**- 2000, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the above THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THIRD 
PARTY DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by placing same in the 
U S Mail, postage prepaid, to Brent D Young, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North 
University Ave., P. 0 Box 657, Provo, UT 84603. 
\Wrn t %k m-1 i r 
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N. UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MEMORANDUM DECISION DATED 2 JUNE 
2000 
ooOoo-
'enny Brockbank, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
James L. Brockbank, 
Defendant and Aooellant. 
FILED 
JUN 0 2 2QQQ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990547-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u n e 2 , 2000) 
2 0 0 0 UT ADD 153 
Seventh District, Price Department 
The Honorable Bruce K. Halliday 
Attorneys: 3rent D. Young and Laura M. Grossman, Provo, for 
Appellant 
John E. Schindier, Price, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, 3iliings, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
The trial court issued an order which "restrained and 
enjoined [appellant] from taking any action to convey or pledge 
any of the real property awarded him by the Supplemental Decree." 
Appellant subsequently conveyed a right of redemption and 
contemporaneously executed a warranty deed conveying his 
remaining interest in the property. Appellant argues the 
conveyance of his right of redemption did not violate the court 
order because a right of redemption is not an interest in 
property subject to the order. As discussed in Knickerbocker v. 
Cannon, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah 1996), the purpose of the trial 
court's order was "to prevent the parties from removing the 
marital assets from the jurisdiction of the [trial] court." Id. 
at 976. Appellant's use of a warranty deed to convey an interest 
in property is evidenced by the language of the deed: "JAMES L. 
BROCKBANK, grantor of Price, County of Carbon, hereby conveys and 
warrants to . . . ." Cf. Stucki v. Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 201 P. 2d 
486, 490 (1949) (stating best method to convey property interest 
is by deed) ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1994) (governing 
form of warranty deed: "Conveyances of land may be substantially 
in the following form . . . " ) . Thus, the trial court was 
justified in finding appellant in contempt for violating its 
order prohibiting him from conveying his real property, and we 
need not determine whether appellant also violated the order by 
conveying his right of redemption. 
Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion 
by ordering him to serve sixty days in jail1 or obtain a 
reconveyance of the property from the third party grantee in 
order to purge the contempt finding. In other words, appellant 
could choose to either serve time in jail, or he could purge the 
contempt finding by obtaining the property back from the third 
party to whom he conveyed it--thus restoring the status quo. 
Appellant chose to serve thirty days in jail,2 and thus he is no 
longer subject to the court's second alternative that he obtain a 
reconveyance in order to purge the contempt. Because the trial 
court's contempt order has been satisfied, the trial court cannot 
impose any further penalties for that contempt and cannot mandate 
that the parties take any further action. Therefore, this court 
can provide no relief affecting the rights of the parties, and 
the issue is moot. See Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119,1)11, 
977 P.2d 1218, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Finally, appellee cross-appeals the trial court's award of 
attorney fees, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to award her the entire amount of her requested fees. 
In her brief, appellee cites no authority supporting her 
position. We '^decline to consider an argument that a party has 
failed to adequately brief. Mf State v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 
2,Til, 974 P.2d 269 (citation omitted). 
1. Under section 78-32-10, "the court may impose a fine not 
exceeding $1,000, order the person incarcerated in the county 
jail not exceeding 30 days, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10 
(1996) . The parties dispute whether the court had authority to 
impose a longer sentence because it found appellant in contempt 
on multiple grounds. 
2. At oral argument, counsel stated that the trial court reduced 
the sixty day sentence to thirty days, and that appellant had 
served thirty days in jail. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's contempt finding 
id award of attorney fees. 
./ • ,X> 
f 
*-*rs-_X^-^^ 
ameia T. Greenwood, 
residing Judge 
I CONCUR: 
TZl/A'o*.^) 
'Judith. M. Billings, Judge" 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K<Orme, Judge 
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